

(e) The Government of India have given the most careful consideration to the system of safeguards, which have been under consideration in the IAEA,⁴ and which are supported by the UK and the USA, and have come to the conclusion that it satisfies none of the three criteria mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The effectiveness of the proposed system, if adopted, in preventing a country from developing a nuclear weapons potential would be inversely proportional to the state of industrial and technological development of the country. It would have the least effect in the highly industrialised countries, while it would be most effective in under-developed countries, which have to seek external aid in order to develop their peaceful atomic energy programmes and which are therefore least capable of producing nuclear weapons on their own. The system would therefore be highly discriminatory in its effect, and would widen the gulf between the technologically advanced and the under-developed countries. A system of safeguards should be universally applicable to all nations without discrimination. The proposal that a system of safeguards should be applied to those countries which are now seeking to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and which are urgently in need of energy for essential developmental programmes, and which would at the same time leave the present nuclear powers completely free from control would not repeat not be reasonable. In a realistic approach, it must also be taken into account that the less developed nations, and particularly those which have recently emerged from colonialism, are naturally apprehensive that external controls and inspection in so vital a sector as power production would tend to result again in a loss of independence unless it can be demonstrated to the contrary. Such a demonstration is possible only if the present nuclear powers are willing to subject themselves fully to the same system as may be proposed for the less developed nations.

(4) It is the earnest hope of the Government of India that the nuclear powers will very soon reach agreement on the banning of nuclear tests, with an agreed detection system. Such a ban will itself become a part of a universal system against the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes. For no repeat no country which is not repeat not already a producer of nuclear weapons would embark on a regular production of such weapons without carrying out at least some tests, which would be detected by the proposed system and immediately reveal the intentions of the country concerned. Thereafter, when the states directly concerned implement proposals, which have now been made by both sides, to ban the manufacture of nuclear weapons, under control, a system for keeping nuclear energy within the ambit of peaceful utilisation will have been achieved. The Government of India have given very careful consideration to what steps should be taken in the meanwhile to achieve the dual objectives of an acceptable system of safeguards and, what is equally important, a system which will not repeat not hamper the rapid development of the atomic energy programmes of nations. In the light of this consideration, the Government of India have come to the view that the following approach to a system of safeguards is the most appropriate one.

(5) In the first place, no repeat no conditions should be attached to the supply of plant and equipment, including nuclear reactors or components thereof. It does not repeat not appear to be practicable or feasible to attach safeguards to the many components of such plant and facilities, most of which can be utilised not repeat not only for reactors but for other non-atomic industrial purposes. It seems to the Government of India that any system which attempted to bring all such machinery under control would break down because it would not repeat not be realistic. It would not repeat not be in the interest of either manufacturing or importing countries to place such onerous restrictions on the flow of equipment and facilities. Conditions on plant and equipment would imply restrictions on the manner of operation of facilities owned by a state, and lying within the territory of the state, and would thus result in

⁴ Voir volume 26, chapitre XI./See Volume 26, Chapter XI.