

*National Defence Act Amendment*

what the goals should be, there was then to be a military appreciation of the various priorities for equipment programs.

At that time, if hon. members will recall, the department operated on the committee system. The senior of these committees, apart from the defence council, was the chiefs of staff committee. It could co-ordinate and it brought about much co-ordination. At the same time it was not necessary for the service chiefs to have all their programs approved by the chiefs of staff from the standpoint of priorities vis-à-vis other programs. Also there was, I think, a tendency for the chiefs of staff to support each other's programs as a sort of *quid pro quo* for support, particularly when there was no real pinch on funds. We had the situation, therefore, where often the programs approved were not in my opinion the ones which were most important for Canada to give us the best balance of military capabilities to carry out the assigned tasks of our armed forces.

Below the chiefs of staff committee there were 200 or 300 other committees with members from the three services and from the civil side and also from the Defence Research Board. They considered a wide variety of subject matters but they had no executive responsibilities. Often it took them weeks or months to reach a decision. Often their decisions were delayed or influenced by single service needs. Once a decision was reached there was no guarantee that it would be put into effect by the three services because each service had the power of veto. The organization, therefore, seemed to leave something to be desired.

The Glassco commission came to the same conclusion. It reported that the amount of money being spent on overhead was too great, that the number of personnel in the headquarters establishments vis-à-vis the fighting machine was too great, that there was a great deal of duplication and triplication among the services and that a better organization was possible.

In considering the situation as we found it, as well as the Glassco commission report, we looked at the alternatives available to us. The one recommended by the Glassco commission was what we call the fourth force theory. It was in effect that those elements which are common to two or more of the services would be transferred to the authority of the chairman of the chiefs of staff. This was an appealing suggestion because it had been talked about and tried, I think, in other

[Mr. Hellyer.]

areas by other military forces. It has some drawbacks, however, which we thought were conclusive.

First, if you gave the chairman of the chiefs of staff executive authority to impose decisions in respect of the support services for the three fighting services you would reduce the chiefs of the three fighting services to mere rubberstamps. If, on the other hand, you did not give this executive authority you would have a continuation of the committee system with all its frustrations, delays and inefficiencies, with perhaps the addition of one extra person to each committee and the consequent increase in cost and inefficiency which would undoubtedly result from that.

Our conclusion, was that based on the experience in the United States, the initial efforts at integration which had taken place here in so far as the doctors and the padres were concerned, and from all information that we could gather from other military forces, the fourth force theory was not the right choice. It was inefficient, cumbersome and probably very expensive.

To meet the cardinal criticism that there was and has been a great deal of duplication and triplication we had to look for another solution. The solution we recommended to the House of Commons and the Canadian people at that time is one which was fundamental. It was the creation of a single military force as an alternative to three or four separate military forces.

We proposed that this would be accomplished in three steps: First, the integration of our headquarters staff in Ottawa on a functional basis; second, a re-evaluation of our field command structure and, third, the formation of a single force. Legislation was introduced in the House of Commons authorizing the first two of these steps. It authorized the integration of the headquarters organization and the reconfiguration of the field command structure.

● (4:50 p.m.)

We began on August 1, 1964 to reorganize the headquarters when the three chiefs of staff and the chairman, chiefs of staff committee, were replaced by a single chief of defence staff. The balance of the headquarters was organized on strictly functional lines, to wit, a vice-chief of defence staff, as is now the case, with executive authority under the chief of the defence staff for all the operations, naval, air and land, for planning of operations, for the operational requirements of all these