

received were useful in carrying out the comprehensive review; more complete answers would have been even more helpful.

As part of its review program, the Committee requested access to a number of documents it believed were essential for it to provide Parliament with an evaluation of the *CSIS Act* and the *Security Offences Act*. Among the documents to which access was requested by the Committee were ministerial directions, reports by the Director of CSIS, certificates and reports by the Inspector General, and reports by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Access to all these documents was denied to the Committee, although a briefing on some of them was given to the members in the absence of its staff. Ultimately, the Committee was also provided with briefings in secure premises by the Privy Council Office, the Deputy Solicitor General, SIRC, CSIS and the RCMP on several other issues — largely in the absence of Committee staff.

Public hearings were, of course, an important element in the Committee's comprehensive review. The issues raised by witnesses before the Committee and the recommendations for change made by them were given serious consideration, and many are reflected in this Report. Written submissions to the Committee and oral testimony by witnesses were synthesized in a Summary of Evidence by Committee staff and structured in the same manner as both the Key Issues Document and the written questions submitted to the main participants in the security and intelligence system. The Summary of Evidence gave the Committee a snapshot of the evidence it had received on a variety of issues and facilitated the preparation of this Report.

Committee staff undertook a number of research projects whose results are reflected in this Report. Similarly, outside legal analysis of issues under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*³ was commissioned.

The Committee did not want to restrict itself to Ottawa but wished to visit a region of Canada where it could gather a variety of opinions in public hearings and, at the same time, visit regional offices of both CSIS and the RCMP's National Security Investigations Directorate. It accomplished this by travelling to Vancouver. The Committee visited only this one Canadian city because of time constraints. It selected Vancouver because it met the above criteria and because the events in the *Atwal* case occurred in British Columbia.

Finally, the Committee decided it wanted to investigate the security and intelligence models with which Canada's is most often compared — those of the United States and Australia. During two days in Washington, D.C., the Committee gained a valuable sense of the U.S. model from the perspectives of both the executive and legislative branches of government, the security and intelligence agencies themselves, and outside observers. The Australian security and intelligence assessment experience was also explored during sessions in Washington. The Committee visited with the Australian Ambassador to the United States, the former head of Australia's Office of National Assessment. The Committee came away with a number of insights that are reflected in this Report.