

In saying that our contribution in no way affects the military power of the alliance, that does not mean that it contains no power itself. Of course the brigade group and the CF-104s contain power, particularly with their nuclear tactical weapons. But the point is that they do not affect in an essential way the over-all military power of NATO. Certainly they do not affect it to the extent that NATO, as it is conceived, would be crippled by their withdrawal, or seriously affected by their withdrawal.

Mr. Ryan: On page 7 in the third line from the top, you say, quote:

If Canada were to declare for non-alignment, and the results was a virtual disbanding of NATO, it is perfectly reasonable to argue that she would be decreasing rather than increasing tensions in Europe.

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It is the term "perfectly" that I am getting at. I think I am quarrelling more with your overstatement or overemphasis than anything else. And in this connection I would like to say something about my view of the current situation in Western Europe and in the Atlantic.

The Soviet fleet—now the second in the world in power—is patrolling from Norway through to Iceland and beyond. It has a four-fifth dominance in the Baltic. It has the Island of Bornholm, the Danish Island, as a hostage, with 100,000 people on it. The Soviet army is sitting on the German plain, in East Germany, with about 20 divisions. It is now a spearhead in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet fleet is passing through the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles. It is in great strength, about 50 units. It is based in Syria and in Egypt, and soon apparently it is to be based at the very new modern facility in Algiers. There is some word to the effect that it is even being refueled in Yugoslavia.

There is also the withdrawal of the whole British military influence in the Middle East and the Far East and there will be a big vacuum there which the Russian fleet is also attempting to fill by coming around through Far East waters at the moment because Suez is closed. With all these prongs like a pitchfork into Western Europe, do you think really that now is the time for us to withdraw from NATO, to hit it really between the eyes, as it were, and to permit this large Russian military build-up to be in a position to take on the Western European allies one at a time?

Professor McNaught: Your assumption underlying this, of course, is that there is a Russian conspiracy to attack us, that it is based on a general intention

of aggression and takeover. I do not see that that is any more valid an assumption than it is to say that the American power is aggressive and maintains fleets in all the places you have mentioned and, indeed, intervenes farther from her borders than as yet Russia has done in strength. The real thrust of your argument is that in some way Canada can contribute significantly to what is, I quite agree with you, a power confrontation all around the world. I think Canada cannot effectively contribute to that and that we should work in every possible way with the money that we would save, which otherwise would be uselessly spent on a military contribution, to eliminate points of tension at which this vast confrontation at any point could blow up.

Mr. Ryan: You would break up this successful unity that has endured for all these years in order to accomplish what?

Professor McNaught: Just what I have said. If one says "successful unity for all these years" one has also to understand, of course, the changing environment during those years and the development of world-devastating weapons which it seems to me does, in fact, go well beyond the older concepts of gunboat diplomacy or even vast land armies fighting from trench to trench in Europe. It is a revolutionary new situation and so infinitely expensive that the real power confrontation cannot be affected by us. Our effect has to be on a non-military line.

Mr. Ryan: Of course, I quite agree that the nuclear confrontation is one thing but it is more the conventional confrontation in Western Europe that I fear will cause a blowup.

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Professor McNaught: Let me put one question by way of illustration. When we had the missile crisis in Cuba in 1962 there was the confrontation of two branches of conventional weaponry by the two super-powers, by Russia trying to get ordinary ships into Cuba and the President of the United States imposing an embargo, but fortunately the confrontation did not move beyond into shooting. But there is mounting evidence, and certainly we all felt it at the time, that the real danger behind that conventional confrontation was nuclear weapons, and I would argue to you that the confrontation of the conventional forces of either of the super powers will always involve that danger of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Ryan: As a historian, Professor, has Russia not had a history of expanding from time to time, retreating somewhat, but always keeping within its maw other tribes, other nationalities, other nations and that this has been a constantly growing process down through the last hundreds of years, so that now there are very few Russians left in Russia, proportionately?