

as Mr. Vyshinsky calls them, appear in certain respects quite inconsistent with the Anglo-French proposals. Mr. Vyshinsky says that his Government has accepted the Anglo-French proposals as a basis. He has asked the General Assembly to instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare a treaty on the basis of the Anglo-French proposals. The Soviet Union has made what is really a series of counter-proposals, which fully bear out the comment which Mr. Vyshinsky made here on Monday that his Government had not accepted our proposals "wholesale". The main outlines of the two sets of proposals, he told us, however, coverage. I hope he is right, but at the first glance which we have been able to give to this problem, some of the Soviet Union counter-proposals seem to diverge from those of the Anglo-French memorandum.

Mr. Vyshinsky complained on Monday that previous speakers had not made their questions sufficiently precise, had not framed them in such a way that he could answer "yes" or "no". I do admit that some of Mr. Moch's very able and, I think, very important questions did not perhaps encourage that kind of abbreviated reply. One way, however, of posing the problem in such a manner that a straight "yes" or "no" answer can be given is to attempt a brief exposition of the Soviet Union proposals regarding control, as I understand them, and to ask Mr. Vyshinsky to correct me if I in any way misrepresent his position.

The basic provisions specified in the new Soviet Union proposals regarding control fall into two stages or phases. In the first phase of reductions of armed forces and armaments, there is to be a temporary control organ set up under the Security Council. In the second phase of reductions and prohibition, as in the first phase, there is to be a control organ which would be totally unable to take the smallest enforcement action in case of violations or evasions without specific authority in each case from the Security Council, where the veto would apply. Mr. Vyshinsky said as much on Monday, and again yesterday, maintaining that only the Security Council was in a position to apply enforcement measures. This is a very important phase of the whole problem. In other words, there is no action which either the temporary or the permanent control organ could take covering either phase of the Soviet Union reductions and prohibition other than to report a violation to the Security Council. I do not think, by the way, that anyone is proposing to give the control organ arbitrary or unnecessary powers over the economic life of any State. But to say that the control organ could do nothing except report, could take no action to stop a violation on the spot, pending investigation and a reference to a higher authority, seems to my mind and to that of my Government to be wholly inadequate.

Still more important, the Soviet Union proposals give the temporary international control commission, which is to control the reductions of the first phase, only -- and here I quote from the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/750) -- "the right to require States to provide the necessary information on the measures taken by them to reduce armaments and armed forces...States shall periodically supply the commission at established intervals with information concerning the implementation of the measures provided for in the convention". I take it that this means that the temporary control commission for this first phase