

A second observation would be that *security-building processes ought to be made as multilateral as possible*, although they do not necessarily need to be global. This requires a simultaneous move "upwards" from bilateral to regional multilateral processes, and downward from global to regional efforts. Moving from bilateral to regional processes (within the most sensible inclusive limits of a region) can mute cultural specificities and minimize the ability of actors to magnify differences that might exist among subsets of them. It might also enhance the influence of (or help catalyze the development of) a shared regional diplomatic/security culture (ie: arms control experts, etc.), and lower, to some extent, the potentially disruptive role of actors (such as the armed forces) by bringing a larger set of interests (economic, societal) to bear on a security-building process. Moving from the global to the regional level, on the other hand, mutes the "inter-civilizational" and North-South rhetoric that has crippled such forums as the Conference on Disarmament, and allows regional participants to focus on their security concerns (and hence to influence the process) without feeling that they were being forced to deal with an imposed agenda.

Of course, as the stalled Middle East Peace Process illustrates, a multilateral process (such as in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group) cannot substitute for the engagement of the parties to the conflict. In fact, it also illustrates that the relationship between multilateral and bilateral or minilateral processes is a complex one that can itself trigger disagreements. As Ahmed Fakhri points out:

The Arabs understood that bilateral negotiations were created to solve the various bilateral problems between the concerned parties...[and] the multilateral talks were designed to solve the regional problems of the future, after the achievement of peace in the new Middle East. Unfortunately the Americans and the Israelis defined the value of the multilaterals differently: they were to facilitate the work of the bilateral negotiations.³⁰

A third conclusion would be that policy-makers should *seek out regional entrepreneurial leaders* as linchpins for efforts to break out of established patterns and to move forward on a concrete security-building agenda. Entrepreneurial leaders are those individuals who grasp the janus-faced nature of a security culture: who can understand that cultural factors shape decision-makers' perceptions of a situation and limit their freedom of action, while at the same time they can be used by creative leaders to legitimize new policy departures. Of course, policy departures must be presented in an authentic "voice" that reduces the risks associated with any security-building process, and hence one should beware of the partner who may have lost (from the point of view of his/her compatriots) this authentic voice. This is especially a problem in diplomatic culture, where a great premium is placed on dealing with individuals (in foreign policy elites) who can respond in familiar ways that may well be at odds with whatever cultural tradition from which they may have emerged. Hence in Latin America, for example (as Hal Klepak points out), although diplomats often make pleasant interlocutors, they seldom have real power on security issues, and their adeptness at the diplomatic game helps conceal this weakness. On the other side of the coin, a failure to understand the domestic political imperatives leaders face (such as a need, for example, in Arab cultures to engage in occasionally florid or aggressive rhetoric) can lead outsiders to ignore possibly valuable interlocutors.

A final point would be that in the absence of such entrepreneurial leaders, policies should probably attempt a two-pronged strategy to *encourage a normative transformation* in domestic politics and policies. At the international level, case studies from a variety of issue areas (security and other) confirm the

³⁰ Fakhri, 184.