plans to pursue the development of strategic defence systems are, like all other weapons systems developed before them, justified as being the ulitmate technological solution to the problem of war — finally, we are told in the most pious of terms, the earth will be rid of the scourge of war by virtue, not of the elimination of weapons of destruction, but by virtue of the development of new, technologically more sophisticated, weapons systems that will, like Alfred Nobel's gun powder, make war obsolete.

We are not fooled by these claims because we understand that weapons systems are developed, not explicitly for the prevention for war, but for the pursuit of the national interest (security defined as political and economic predominance).

The arms race, the competition for weapons systems that will produce advantages for their deployers, is out of control.

Canadian policy should recognize the urgent need to establish control over nuclear weapons, and the following recommendations suggest some policy options for Canada.

## 2. Limits on Innovations in Weapons Technology:

Innovations in weapons technology provide one of the most persistent and difficult to control motivations to the nuclear arms race. Weapons research in the United States, for example, will consume \$39 billion in 1986 and, of course, the Strategic Defence Initiative will alone consume about \$30 billion in the next five years. With resources of that magnitude devoted to the development of new weapons technology, innovation is inevitable — and destabilizing. Occurring in secret, weapons