

Dr. Lantaret who fully endorsed the opinions so thoroughly liberal which had been expressed, proved that there is no true liberty but in the truth.\* If the Waldenses are something they owe it to the truth which they profess. It is not enough to proclaim liberal doctrines; the principles of the Gospel must be made to penetrate into families, and into the people. And those who have a great influence are the more bound to labour for that end. He closed by exhorting each one not to lessen what pertained to his share of responsibility in this respect.

After other toasts from Advocate J. Vola to the memory of Charles Albert and to the 17th of February, 1848; from Inspector Rolando to the Waldensian schools; from the Syndic of Rora to the Prince of Naples; and from M. Ernest Turin to the Waldensian pastors; the prefect arose and said: "It is not in order for me, in my present capacity, to make a speech, but I cannot refrain from assuring you that I am an attentive witness, and that I shall not fail to give utterance in the proper quarter, to the feelings which I now have, and to tell what a warm expression of devotion to the king and the country I have heard in these valleys."

The prefect's report was so favourable that four days after he made it his Majesty, to give the Waldenses another proof of his kindness and satisfaction, named, of his own free will, Chev. Arthur Peyrot, of the Fort, Officer of the Order of the Crown of Italy, and Messrs. Boer, syndic of Torre Pellice, and Meille, pastor in Turin, chevaliers of the same.

In my next paper I shall give an account of the closing festival, which was of a nature altogether different from that of any of the others.

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### POINTE-AUX-TREMBLES AGAIN.

"By faith Joseph gave commandment concerning his bones."

Joseph lived in an age and in a country that had a very decided fashion as to what was the proper thing to do with the bones of its great men. Never in any other country has the rage for magnificent monuments developed to such heights and breadths as in Egypt in those its days of power and wealth. The pyramids have always been counted among the world's wonders, and these were Egypt's monuments for her dead. But the commandment that the dying Joseph gave concerning his bones paid no respect at all to this magnificent fashion of his day. He did not tell them to build a pyramid for their reception that should be second only to that of Pharaoh. The commandment he gave paid respect to God's promises and purposes, and robbed any proposed pyramid of all its glory by enlisting even his bones into the ranks of a pilgrim people. Who would build an everlasting pyramid for bones that within a generation or two were to be snatched away and buried in a distant land? "By faith" Joseph did it. Not only did this commandment run clean in opposition to the monumental fashion of his day, but it actually enrolled the honoured bones themselves into the ranks of believers among the people of Israel. Whether God's people kept true to God's places and purposes for them or not, Joseph's bones should keep true. Pilgrim's bones, waiting and ready for marching orders, Joseph planned it so that he, "being dead," might still "speak" for God—might still actively engage in the real service of God. Was it not a beautiful thought? So beautiful that God's own finger has written it out in letters of light in the 11th chapter of Hebrews.

Now, the Lord's work is a need. The girls' building put up this summer must be furnished if it is to be used. The furnishing requires close upon \$2,500, for very little has yet come in. The Lord's cause may be able to get credit in the stores, but would it not be so much better that those who buy for Him should be enabled to pay cash? So strongly do I feel that this should be the case that I have decided to appeal to Christian "bones" to help. Are there any "bones" that will enlist in this service for the Master's cause and honour? Are there any dear disciples who, like Joseph, are nearing the river, or at least thinking over the river, who can think of the earthward side of it as well as the glory side of it? Who can bear to think of the beautiful headstone or towering monument that sorrowing friends will surely put up in their memory? How many of these can tread in Joseph's steps, and say joyfully: "My bones too shall enlist in the service of Christ, and they shall lie and listen for the Master's voice marked by no towering, glittering monument; and the gold that would be spent on that I shall send with my own hand to Christ's work at Pointe-aux-Trembles." And so the very bones, precious already to the Master's sight, by self-denial and continuing service, shall be reckoned among "those that help Me."

The fashion of the day now is the same as that of Egypt in Joseph's time—a straining after monumental magnificence. We cannot build pyramids, but each in his measure seems to seek to outdo his neighbour in putting up for a dear departed one a costly headstone or a beautiful monument. And when this is the fashion it is difficult and painful to begin to vary from it, unless the dear departed one shall do as Joseph did, and, dying, "give commandment concerning his bones." What a revenue for Christ's work would be gained if even one-half of the Christians dying in Canada alone were to say to those about them: "Put up no monument for me. Plant a fir-tree at the head of my grave, and give what you would

spend on my tombstone to the Lord's work." A simple and inexpensive stone to mark the spot might be put up when friends decidedly wished it, or "a boulder from the field," as mentioned in Mr. Cameron's will, but the writer very much likes the idea of a fir-tree. There may, perhaps, be practical difficulties; but the fir, with its upward-pointing fingers and its drooping, spreading branches and evergreen leaf, seems richly suggestive. Then that one clause in Isaiah: "Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree," makes it more appropriate still.

At the 1889 annual gathering of the Woman's Foreign Missionary Society an expression of Mary Lyon's was quoted which lingers in memory something in this shape: "If Christ's work is to be carried on effectively, we must be brought to give up our luxuries for His sake. Then we shall soon come to laying many of our comforts at His feet. And before the good news shall have been faithfully delivered to every creature under heaven, Christians shall be brought, for His sake, joyfully to deny themselves many of the things that we now count necessities." Dear fellow-Christians, are not magnificent monuments "luxuries"? Can we give them up for His sake who, for our sakes, suffered the reality of death that we might never know more than its shadow? And then let us look around and see what other luxuries shall go next. To us "it is given" in the behalf of Christ not only to believe on Him, but also "to deny ourselves for His sake." Precious honour given to us! Shall we not prize it? ANNA ROSS.

Brucefield, Ont., September 30, 1890.

### THE EVOLUTION IN THE MANIFESTATION OF THE SUPERNATURAL.

(Continued.)

The necessity of beholding in nature the embodiment of a plan originating in divine wisdom has been recognized by some who at the same time have contended that this conception is simply a hypothesis, necessary for our understanding of nature, but not objectively real in it. But the very fact that we trace this adaptation, not in every detail, but in some things rather than others, shows that it has a ground in the nature of things, and is not purely inward. Besides, a hypothesis which corresponds to observed facts and furnishes a real explanation of them, as is the case with this, justifies its claim to validity. It has been further recognized that in nature as a whole, and in its parts, there is really an adaptation and a movement towards definite ends, but with the recognition of this it has been contended that this is simply nature seeking to realize its own essential character, uniting cause, means and end in the one principle; and attaining self-realization without going outside itself. According to this, nature first exists as an idea, which gradually externalizes itself. This very conception expresses a distinction between the operative idea and the externalized result. Moreover, an idea can exist only in a mind. Hence this existence as an idea must have been in the mind of Him who planned it. The attempt has also been made to evade the reference to supernatural wisdom by likening the realization of ends in nature to the instinctive actions of the lower animals. It is claimed that in many of these there is action towards a definite end where there can be no consciousness of the end on the part of the animal. The same unconscious movement, it is urged, may characterize nature. This is to explain nature by a fact in it, which itself needs explanation. To assert action towards an end, without any consciousness of the end, is a contradiction. But the consciousness does not necessarily inhere in the immediate agent. The first cause may readily control the agent to certain ends otherwise than by a consciousness of these; and our reason demands this conscious control in the instinctive actions of animals, just as much as in the general course of nature. Thus in addition to the manifestations of power and intelligence the voice of nature is heard proclaiming, and increasing in emphasis with the dawn of life, God exists, a God of wisdom. While external nature may give faint indications of further divine features, these are the ones most prominently revealed.

In the next period, that of the appearance of man, the creative process reaches a higher stage. All that has already emerged of the supernatural now stands out with greater distinctness. Man is endowed with these divine attributes in such a manner that when human energy and intellect and wisdom are brought into contact with the divine manifestations embodied in nature, they take on a character, different from what they presented to the mere observer, and lend themselves to the production of effects, which unaided nature had never achieved. Every product of art declares a power and a wisdom that has been imparted to nature, but needed human contact to call it forth. Harnessing the energies of nature to mechanism, man causes them to give forth new exercises of power subservient to his wishes. Moreover, the very existence of the human mind is a manifestation of a divine intellect. Every exercise of thought is valid, only on a supposition that there is an absolute Reason, whose nature is the criterion of certitude in all human reason. The fact that we suppose, and must suppose, reason everywhere to be the same, the judgment that its necessary truths are absolutely universal, finds its only solution in the existence of Him, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Moreover, the existence of such attributes as power, intelligence and wisdom in the unity of a human personality furnishes a revelation concerning the manner of their subsistence in God. The author of human personality can-

not be impersonal. Personality with Him may mean much more than it does with men. It cannot mean less.

But through man additional divine attributes merge into view. Possessed of a bodily life similar to that of the lower animals in nature, he is possessed also of a spiritual life all his own. To this belongs his moral nature. He possesses a principle within him, which on the occasion of appropriate experience discloses to him the fact of rightness, and in that disclosure places him under obligation to do what is right. The consciousness of obligation is just another phase of the knowledge of right. The right is that which man ought to do. This consciousness is not derived from any intimation of outward authority, nor from any training which associates pleasure and pain with certain classes of actions. It is not generated from considerations of individual or general well-being. It is not evolved out of a gradual, long-continued process of adaptation to social environment. These might, perhaps, explain a conditional imperative, an inward voice saying, do this if you wish such and such results. But they have no explanation to give of the categorical imperative with which conscience speaks. They furnish no ground for asserting, I ought to do right. The idea of right carrying in itself the obligation to do it is ultimate, inexplicable, irreducible. It may be called forth, where it lies dormant, but cannot be imparted to an absolutely non-moral being. Whence came it? Clearly from the Author of our being, who accordingly must Himself possess a knowledge of moral distinctions. The Creator of man cannot be non-moral. Moreover, the sense of responsibility declares that God is a moral governor. Obligation to duty cannot be shifted at will. Man may disregard the voice of conscience. By repeated refusals to obey, he may obscure the sense of it. But he cannot alter the imperativeness of its utterance. It constrains him to acknowledge a moral supremacy that cannot be shaken off. His will is powerless to free him from the consciousness of responsibility. Is this not saying in other words: that the Supreme Being is one to whom we are responsible, whose will we are under obligation to obey, who is our moral governor, and has implanted within us the recognition of His authority? But, further, this sense of responsibility is not the obligation to obey an unknown or arbitrary will, not the recognition that we ought to fulfil commands from a certain source irrespective of their character. It is the feeling of obligation to do right actions. It is not necessary to enquire here, how the moral qualities of actions are determined. Conscience, in saying, You ought to do right, declares that righteousness belongs to Him, under whose moral government we are. This sense of obligation to right conduct, in which He makes known His will within us, cannot but be an expression of His own character. Besides, the issues of obedience to, or disregard of, the voice of conscience, in the moral experience of mankind, while mixed in character, yet on the whole bear witness that God is a moral governor, who loves righteousness and hates iniquity. This testimony is not contradicted by the fact that sin exists and is so prevalent. There is mystery here, before which we have to confess our ignorance. That the permission of sin sometimes becomes the condition of worthy ends may be a partial explanation. For the rest, our moral natures assure us that He, whose purpose is expressed in our consciousness of responsibility to act aright, cannot be the author of moral evil. Thus in advance of the manifestations of the supernatural in external nature, the spirit with the breath of man proclaims: God reigns, a God of righteousness.

But, through his moral nature, man recognizes not only a law of duty defining conduct, but a thought of good inspiring it. This is a psychological fact equally with the idea of right. These two ideas are distinct from one another, yet inseparable. The conception of right action is not simply that of striving to attain what is good, neither is the good purely identical with doing right. The one implies a standard, by which actions are tested, the other an ideal, towards which the person tends. Yet a true standard will be associated with the highest good, and a worthy ideal will be reached through right action alone. What is right is to be done for its own sake regardless of consequences; but in determining the moral quality of actions, their tendency to promote the highest good cannot be left out of view. With the thought of the good we are again in contact with an ultimate, irreducible idea. It may be possible to specify elements entering into the realization of it, but it is something more than the sum of these elements. It is not identical with happiness, but in realizing it happiness cannot be altogether lost sight of. It is not a purely personal end, without regard to our fellow-beings, but not an end from which all personal considerations are shut out. It presents itself to the mind as worthy to be striven after, and satisfactory when attained. The possession of this unrealized, yet approachable ideal, testifies to a capacity for moral progress. Like the instinct of the lower animals, this impulse after good is an indication of the proper destiny of man. Unlike instinct, however, it includes an intelligent appreciation of the end, and its attainment must be freely sought, if sought at all. The fact that man possesses the idea of the highest excellence, and the impulse towards it, implies that the Author of His being has implanted this ideal within him, and has designed that he should realize his true nature in attaining it. Such ideal and design can spring only from a God, who Himself is good. Moreover, as man seeks to do right for its own sake, he attains a measure of the good. As duty is realized in character, and the conception of right filled with content, there is continual approach towards ideal excellence. This intimates that God in His righteousness has purposed, that man should realize such excellence, and in that purpose has given a revelation of His own character. The prevalence of suffering has been urged as inconsistent with divine goodness. So far as suffering is connected with sin, it calls for no separate explanation. Besides, since good is not identical with mere enjoyment, suffering is not necessarily antagonistic to it. Moreover, if there be a highest good of all creation, towards which the ages are progressing, involving in itself the subordinate end of every creature, suffering may be a means towards it. As a matter of fact, both in outward nature and in man pain often works out wise and benevolent results. In all these there is nothing to contradict that ideal of excellence within us, which urges towards its own realization, and discloses Him, in whom it is fulfilled. Thus the spirit within man, which attested the righteousness of God, is heard also declaring: God reigns a God of goodness.

\*He is the freeman whom the truth makes free,  
And all are slaves besides.—*Conover.*