

It was no surprise that, until Chancellor Willy Brandt initiated his Ostpolitik, NATO faced a constant pressure on Berlin in particular and West Germany in general. The Soviet Union proceeded to consolidate its military hold over the buffer area at the expense of the liberty of the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. A stalemate to this reciprocating "push-comes-to-shove" strategy in Europe was recognized in the accords at Helsinki, at least as far as the territorial status quo dividing Europe was concerned. There was, however, no accompanying Soviet recognition of the human rights and liberties of its subject peoples at home or in the Soviet-occupied countries. Soviet leaders claim that the siege mentality cultivated mutually by NATO and the Warsaw Pact justifies their position.

The leading powers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact now represent two overlapping global military powers pursuing conflicting global policies in a dynamic setting of Third World instability. It follows that this overlapping of imperial power cannot be resolved within the limits of a regional military alliance like NATO.

Moreover, now that the Dulles model of a monolithic "world Communist threat" has been shattered by the open breach with China and with most of the Communist parties of Europe, political and economic aspects of alliance strategy can be ignored even less than before. As far as the U.S. is concerned, a new multipolar competition has been added to the old bipolar confrontation across the Iron Curtain in Europe. In the last few years, developments among Third World countries and the stupendous rise in oil prices engineered by the OPEC governments have emphasized the link between economic co-operation and security as never before. The link between the prosperity of the Western world and the stability of the Third World, which Pearson recognized in 1955, is now more evident than ever.

According to a recent article in the *New York Times*: (United States) exports to developing countries are more important than United States exports to the EEC, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China combined. Over 20% of United States direct investment goes to the Third World; the rate of return is double that of investments in the developed countries. . . . Debt, food, add to them the commodity prices and trade barriers, not to mention a host of political questions ranging from the law of the sea to Cuban troops in Africa, and it is all too obvious that, in good times and bad, the interests of the Third World and the West are bound with hoops of steel.

Are these "hoops of steel" taken sufficiently into account in planning Canada's position in NATO? Gellner rightly states: "Membership in a defence alliance such as NATO implies co-operation, and this in turn calls for adjustment to a common strategic concept. It does not mean that a member is absolved from doing his own strategic thinking and whenever this is necessary, his own defence planning."

Gone are the days of the Fifties and early Sixties, when General Charles Foulkes, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, relied on "Brad" and "Rad" (General Omar Bradley and Admiral Radford) of the Pentagon to pass up through the "old-boy network" of strict confidentiality suggestions about what Canada should do in its defence planning. In 1955, Pearson and Prime Minister St Laurent requested of the then Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, that there should be joint planning with Exter-

nal Affairs in order to work out the implications of the complexities of the nuclear-missile age. These appeals were studiously ignored by General Foulkes on the grounds that it might cut off U.S. intelligence if "egg-heads" from External Affairs were allowed to share confidential advice received from the Pentagon.

No excuse

Now that Canada, in matters of defence relations, ranks below West Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Iran so far as the U.S. is concerned, there is no excuse for any refusal to be weaned away from dependence on the Pentagon. Moreover, we now risk having our decisions influenced unduly by our European allies. For them, the bipolar confrontation remains of primary concern. They do not wish to have the traditional Canadian participation in the "Watch on the Rhine" suffer any weakening that might prejudice the American guarantee of European security.

In the post-Korean period of the re-equipment of the Canadian armed forces, dependence on Pentagon influence caused us to make some costly mistakes. The greatest of these was accepting a strike role for the air component of our NATO forces in Central Europe — albeit without the nuclear ammunition to enable us to do more than go through the motions of practising for such a role. We also purchased other weapons equally unsuitable for use without the necessary nuclear ammunition, such as the *Honest John* and *Bomarc*, and without the required sanction of the Government on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

We are now engaged in the most extensive re-equipment process since these mistaken efforts of the Fifties and Sixties. Are we about to repeat this kind of error by failing to clarify the role of our forces first and then deciding precisely what equipment most suits the role? Gellner, who once served in the Department of National Defence and is thus familiar with its kind of planning procedures, expressed his fears as follows:

There is a distinct danger now that Canada should be caught again just as it was almost 20 years ago, only this time an error would be even more expensive. For a change, what is involved is Canada's maritime contribution to NATO. At present, Canada's equipment-procurement policy is predicated on a stated NATO requirement for keeping open in time of war the transatlantic lanes along which troop reinforcements and supplies would supposedly move in huge quantities, just as in World War II.

Preparing for the previous war is one of the characteristics of planning from a purely military standpoint. Convoys of the Second World War type are not probable in the nuclear war of the future. That is why the Americans are building up reserve stocks of other kinds of military hardware in Europe. Why should Canadians not be doing the same thing, rather than opting for expensive anti-submarine naval vessels and aircraft for convoy and anti-submarine warfare missions? As for purchases of tanks, aircraft and other conventional hardware, which have to be updated from time to time, one wonders whether we are making the most of this opportunity to achieve the much needed standardization of equipment in NATO. If Canada were to accept a standard of equipment in which some of its European allies were specializing, such as tanks, why should these allies not reciprocate by accepting Canadian standards for equipment in which Canada specializes, such