

corps almost entirely, and the Dutch government officials almost unanimously so far as they expressed their views openly, were inclined to minimize any immediate danger to Holland, and regretted any tendency toward nervousness or alarm. The "notice" of Holland's determination to resist any attack was considered salutary to the international situation; the moral support of common interests between Holland and Belgium, if not sealed by any formal political or military accord, was at least regarded as a strong and cohesive factor, in confrontation of a common danger. The general military and international situation seemed to offer little promise of advantage to Germany for an invasion of the Low Countries: so much so that on January 15th a political correspondent in Copenhagen wrote in "Politiken" that "One thing is definite. In Germany they find it inconvenient to launch an offensive via Belgium and Holland", and a number of other foreign papers took the same confident tone. The sudden thaw of January 14th - 15th seemed to remove any supposed advantages which might have accrued from frozen conditions, though these advantages were themselves hypothetical. Above all it is recognized that such a German attempt on the Low Countries would be rash, inexpedient and foolhardy, and can offer little political or military advantage to Germany in the long run.

2. The Alarm.

4. The foregoing factors, whether regarded as unrelated incidents or as parts of a single pattern, had not actually aroused any special alarm in either Belgium or Holland, until one or two other events seemed to bring them all into sudden focus.