

*Foreign Policy*

Wilson and complaining about secret diplomacy as though quiet diplomacy and secret diplomacy were the same kind of thing or even the other side of the same coin. The real fact is that no one can carry on diplomacy unless it be quiet. It ceases to be diplomacy if it is not quiet. You would not be able—

**Mr. Diefenbaker:** You should tell Mr. Gordon that.

**Mr. Martin (Essex East):** —to enjoy the confidence of others if this were not the case. For instance, in my talks with the Secretary General I am sure that if I had not established a standard of credibility with him it would not have been possible for me to receive at his hands certain information which I believe to be very important and which I passed on to my colleagues in the government, as he has passed it on to certain other spokesmen for other governments.

It must also be understood that quiet diplomacy is not part of foreign policy, as some hon. gentlemen in this house, at least by implication, suggest. Quiet diplomacy is not policy. Quiet diplomacy is not a program. It is an instrument. It is a technique, and no one employed it, and rightly so, more successfully than my right hon. friend in certain situations such as that which confronted his government with respect to the Congo.

• (4:30 p.m.)

There are occasions when a government should not hesitate to make a public declaration of policy, but that is not inconsistent with the necessity, for instance, of Canada as a member of the commission treating matters with colleague states in a confidential way. Certainly that is the only way one would carry on discussions in this matter with the government of Hanoi, either through Mr. Ronning or through our present representative on the commission. Certainly one could not enjoy very long the confidence of any government unless one had created a reputation for respecting confidences and had won, as a result, a credibility where it is necessary for the Canadian government and other governments to make contacts if they are going to make their contribution to try to bring about an end to this very difficult and regrettable war in Viet Nam.

On this subject I would simply remind the house what a former Canadian diplomat, Mr. Escott Reid, pointed out the other day, namely, that quiet diplomacy is the application of sound practice in our relations with other countries. I hope that no one is going to say

the government is refusing to give information because it observes something that every government, in the conduct of its affairs with other countries, must do in the interests of satisfactory relations and the attainment of its objectives.

We are a member of the commission. We have been there for 13 years along with India and Poland. Charges of spying against our personnel are unfounded, and I regret that my right hon. friend brought that question up today. I want to say, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, that we have every reason to be proud of the soldiers who from 1955 on have served Canada on the commission. Certainly I as Secretary of State for External Affairs am proud of the record of integrity and purpose of the foreign service officers of the Department of External Affairs who under difficult circumstances have served the cause of peace and international conciliation in a way that should win expressions of gratitude and occasion the pride which I feel in this service and in what they have done as members of this commission.

When a year ago last January the Secretary General and I discussed the question of Viet Nam I was persuaded by his argument that the settlement of this problem must be within the framework of the Geneva conference. Regrettable as it was, the United Nations, the security council or the assembly, could not be expected to deal effectively with this problem because of the absence from its membership of particular countries involved. From that moment on we sought, as I have reminded the house time and time again, to impress upon India and Poland the desirability of constituting the three members on the commission into a body that might have as its prime purpose the narrowing of the gap between the parties, based on the fact that this instrument has a readier access to Hanoi and to Saigon than any other instrument. We have not been able to persuade all the members of the commission of the importance of this proposition although both Poland and India have recognized the potential role for the commission in this situation.

We did not limit our efforts only to our role as a member of the commission, but on two occasions we sent Mr. Chester Ronning as a special emissary of the government of Canada to Hanoi, to Saigon and to Washington for the purpose of seeing whether or not he, in the name of the government of Canada, could