

But of vital concern to our policy culture is where we, as a nation, stand in the Darwinian pace of technological innovation and obsolescence: whether we can keep up; whether we can identify the right sectors for concentration and ensure an international environment which is congenial for their development; whether our place is up on the sharp edge of new science, or back on the handle of the resource pump; or whether we can be in both places at once.

I have so far been attempting to sketch for you some elements of continuity and change in what I have termed the Canadian policy culture. Now I want to indicate how these elements have been expressed. In a more specific way, in intellectual frameworks for our international behaviour, priorities and initiatives.

It is commonly alleged that there are basically two schools of thought, and it is these two which I hope to persuade you are fundamentally one. The two schools may be named after the Canadian statesmen most commonly associated with them: the Pearsonian approach to internationalism, and the Trudovian approach to national interests.

My proposition is that these contrasting tendencies are by no means mutually exclusive, that both are deeply rooted in our policy culture, and that an emphasis on one or the other is as much determined by international realities as by fluctuations in our national mood. Moreover, these two themes are, for better or for worse, among the instruments which our country will deploy in coping with the future.

Pearson's internationalism

When we speak of Pearsonian internationalism we usually refer to the postwar period of institution-building in which Canada, and many eminent Canadians, took such an effective part, at the San Francisco conference to found the United Nations in 1945, or at the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, Canada was not only present but visible, articulate and influential.

It was a time when our own national strength, our specific gravity in the world, was perhaps at its most solid in relation to others. Our armed forces were large and modern. Our economic circumstances were ideally adapted to postwar development, and our infrastructure had not been ravaged by wartime destruction.

And yet I think we learn something about ourselves and our policy culture from the fact that, at the moment when our national power was at its height, we chose to channel our energies towards the creation of an international system which would promote security and prosperity for others as well as ourselves.

The Canadian statesmen of that period saw no contradiction between world order and national interest. Indeed, we came very early to the conclusion that we could only pursue our national interests in a stable and open international environment. We needed to assert ourselves if we were not to be left out of the process shaping the
