

To support UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and strengthen the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification capabilities, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states parties should be required to report to the OPCW on the measures they are taking to meet their 1540 obligations as they relate to chemical weapons. To the extent possible, the Secretariat of the OPCW should, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee, monitor compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of 1540 insofar as they are related to chemical weapons. (Recommendation 24)

Renewed efforts to develop an effective verification and compliance regime for biological weapons should be high priority. Support should be provided to proposals to strengthen the UN Secretary-General's power to verify alleged use of biological and toxin weapons as well as suspect biological facilities. States should release publicly their confidence building measures, and the establishment of a small secretariat to monitor BTWC confidence building measures should be considered. This secretariat could also monitor reports submitted by states in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1540, as they relate to biological weapons. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) should be encouraged to hold annual meetings between review conferences beyond the 2006 Review Conference to address 'compliance management' issues and important biological weapons-related developments. (Recommendations 29, 30, 31, and 33)

States should be urged to consider the negotiation of regional measures on missile-related non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, focusing initially on confidence-building measures including transparency and voluntary mutual monitoring of commitments. (Recommendation 38)

The UN should be encouraged to continue its efforts in the missile field, with special attention to norm-building and confidence building measures, as a first step towards fully developed verification and compliance mechanisms. (Recommendation 39)

Addressing Emerging Verification Challenges

The IAEA Additional Protocol should become the new compulsory standard for nuclear safeguards. States should not receive nuclear technology or materials transfers unless they conclude such agreements. (Recommendation 15)

The adoption of higher standards for verifying nuclear accounting, safety and physical protection should be given a high priority. Negotiations on strengthening the Convention on Physical Protection should be concluded as soon as possible. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, including sections relating to the import and export guidelines, should be made obligatory and legally binding. The IAEA should verify compliance with both the Physical Protection Convention and the Code of Conduct. (Recommendation 16)

The IAEA should commission an expert study to develop a standardized system of accounting for all fissile material for all states (Recommendation 17).

To enhance the verifiability of peaceful nuclear programmes, consideration should be given to the internationalization of all uranium reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, beginning with any new