

significant reductions in strategic forces could well help push New Delhi into action.

If the two principal factors driving India's nuclear weapons programme – China and international status – can be linked to counter-proliferation (through reduction of the Chinese threat, and the linkage of international status to arms reductions rather than increasing nuclearization), then there will be a real if slight prospect of freezing, and perhaps eventually rolling back, India's nuclear arsenal. However, the issues which matter to India, such as a seat on the Security Council, acceptance of its nuclear status, renegotiation of the NPT, acceptance of its position on Kashmir, show the enormous distance there is to cover merely on the international status side of the national nuclear issue. On the Chinese threat side, there would be a need to see one or some of the following: a reduction in Beijing's conventional and nuclear forces, an end to what India sees as its hegemonic aspirations, a halt to sabre-rattling in the South China Sea, a change in the status of Tibet, and a rejection of the policy of nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. The challenge is clear.

Pakistan – Reversing the Path to Nuclearization

In view of the forces driving Pakistan's decision to "go nuclear", there are a number of potential internal and external incentives and pressure points available to the outside world. Foremost among the internal incentives is rebuilding Pakistan's economy. Islamabad is faced with a debt crisis in which debt servicing is consuming an unsustainable proportion of the nation's wealth. Debt cancellation and financial assistance are therefore two of the readiest levers for the international community to exploit. These could be linked to developmental incentives and assistance, particularly with the process of industrialization, national infrastructure (particularly transport and communications, both of which have been allowed to decay in recent years) and the provision of social services.

As with India, Pakistan would benefit greatly from nuclear power assistance from the Western world, with a view to both providing the energy needed for industrialization, and to ensure that nuclear power development is consistent with the highest safety standards. Again, given the state of Pakistan's nuclear programme, it is unlikely that the provision of such assistance would do any significant further damage to non-proliferation.

An option with fewer prospects of success would be to offer qualified support to Pakistan's position on Kashmir, particularly with respect to the fate of its Muslim inhabitants. With no actual peace agreement between India and Pakistan (which Western support for one side would almost certainly preclude) there should be no suggestion of Western military involvement, but this option, while it would alienate India, might, if sufficiently equitable and broadly-based, convince New Delhi to demonstrate flexibility on the issue and facilitate the beginnings of meaningful negotiations. This option would have to be tied to considerable incentives for India and it is difficult to imagine how those could be put together in the present context.