> Cabinet ministers or the equivalent, working in the same issue-area, initially from a relatively small number of relatively rich countries, got together to make rules. Trade ministers dominated GATT; finance ministers ran the IMF; defense and foreign ministers met at NATO; central bankers at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). They negotiated in secret, then reported their agreements to national legislatures and publics." [5]

This was not a pure model of course; finance ministers were necessarily involved in trade policy decisions, because of the revenue reduction that tariff cuts implied. But by and large, other ministers were effectively excluded by the device of holding negotiations under the shroud of diplomatic secrecy and presenting the results to domestic Cabinet colleagues as largely unalterable *faits accomplis*.

One reason that this was possible is that the early rounds restricted themselves to dealing with easy-to-understand border measures—for the most part, the tariff. Broader issues "behind the border" were not tackled, and other ministries therefore did not need to get involved. By the same token, they did not clamour for such access either. As Keohane and Nye argue:

> "The club model was very convenient for officials negotiating agreements within issue-areas, since .... officials in other government bureaucracies, and in international organizations defined as working in different issue-areas, were excluded from the negotiations. Environmental, labour rights, and finance officials did not participate in a regular basis in WTO

[5] See, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the WTO: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy", paper delivered at the conference *Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium*, June 1-2, 2000, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/trade/keohane.htm .