

from national technical means (NTM) should be used to demand inspections. China, Israel, and Pakistan pushed for inspections to be kept to a minimum, with no opportunity to use them as a pretext for spying or harassment, and they wanted to exclude nationally-gathered information altogether. India and Russia supported the incorporation of NTM provided that human intelligence and espionage were prohibited. Some countries, especially among the non-aligned, feared that the U.S. superiority in intelligence technology would be used to harass American enemies and cover for friends, and that no government had comparable resources to ensure that the United States would not cheat. Not surprisingly, these quarrels were reminiscent of the NPT debates because they once again raised the issue of "haves" versus "have-nots." In this case it was the "verification haves"--Russia and several Western countries--who argued for the inclusion of NTM.

The issue which blocked consensus, and led to a veto in the CD, was the insistence by India that the pact be linked to a "time-bound" nuclear disarmament, a position which won little support at the CD.²⁵ The fact that India--which first proposed a ban on nuclear weapons testing in 1954 and which has traditionally presented itself as an anti-nuclear state--now blocks adoption of the CTBT has been the subject of much speculation. In raising its objections to the Treaty, many believe that India, acting out of national security interests and national pride, was unwilling to close off its nuclear option because looking at China, its one-time adversary, it viewed nuclear capability as a "equalizer" and a pathway to great power status. It is true that the debate over the CTBT raised the issue of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." This political reality, based on the national security interests of the declared and threshold nuclear states, could not be resolved by consensus in the CD, since it is a matter of the political will of each country concerned. However, at least one South Asian expert has suggested that India's intransigence might have been resolved if United States had offered "a sweetener of any sort, as it did, for example with North Korea."²⁶ Whether or not the sweetener would have to be membership on the U.N. Security Council--as some have suggested--it is unlikely that this hypothesis will be tested, given the likely negative international reactions to it. It is possible that India will revert to its previous position of support for the treaty. Changing course will depend on how the treaty is perceived internally, and the external international view that the majority of powers want the CTBT in place.

²⁵ India also asserted that its inclusion on the list of countries that must ratify first left it open to international retaliation if it refused. While the U.S. Secretary of State declared in writing that the United States would not support sanctions against Indian for refusing to sign the accord, the Indian Ambassador to the CD replied that this promise did not carry the force of an internationally-binding agreement.

²⁶ Stephen P. Cohen, quoted in an article by Barbara Crossette. "India Vetoes Pact To Forbid Testing of Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, 21 August 1996.