the activities of another party if it suspects activity in violation of treaty obligations; submission of a formal complaint and request to the UN Security Council for a challenge inspection by the appropriate international inspectorate, to include evidence supporting the validity of the accusation; and detailed procedures for challenge inspection of suspected facilities and activities, without a right of refusal and without a right to deny reasonable access.

Options for an international inspectorate include a new and expanded role for UNSCOM or a new, comparable UN body. In the United States, it has been demonstrated in the case of OSIA that expanded responsibilities for that inspection agency have increased its expertise and knowledge base. A similar case could be made that the experience which UNSCOM has gained in inspecting Iraqi installations and activities would be of great value in future adversarial or coercive verification activities.

Non-proliferation strategy, in general, needs to address both the "demand" and "supply" side of the problem. Regional confidence-building measures may be the best way to alleviate mutual suspicions in the near term; these measures can be developed in settings such as the five-nation conference in South Asia and the Middle East Initiative. International security guarantees will strengthen the CBMs. The United States has already stated that it will "take into account other countries' performance on key international non-proliferation norms in developing its cooperation and technology transfer relationships, and will consult with friends and allies on similar approaches."

On the supply side, additional strengthening of the guidelines and additional membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the MTCR, and the Australia Group will reduce the number of countries which will have to undergo the challenge or special inspections called for in

the non-proliferation arms control agreements. Other actions to enforce international non-proliferation norms include: United Nations Security Council embargoes, inspections, and sanctions; assistance to victims of attacks with such weapons; extradition agreements; immigration or trade restrictions against individuals or companies which have knowingly contributed to proliferation; and various political pressures.

