

Then you have to know whether you want to be in the game at all.

In the case of Europe, you may find that Canada is so impotent that there is no point in even trying because we are simply going to be ignored. Canada, Belgium and so forth will simply not be players and if that is the case then you don't bother spending anything at all. I don't know where that leads me – it sure as heck doesn't lead me to nuclear powered submarines. It doesn't lead to expensive toys.

Thériault: I have never understood why Canadians have come to equate a valid contribution to collective security necessarily [with] the presence of Canadian troops in Europe. It simply is not so. When George Kennan articulated the concept of containment, it was intended to be a set of precautionary, preventative measures to secure Europe and to prevent the Soviets from spilling over Eastern Europe into Western Europe, until such time as the West Europeans could recover from the ravages of war and assume the burden. We have forgotten that, and this whole arrangement has become institutionalized. This hand-holding exercise is totally unjustifiable in hard realistic strategic terms. Why should we not continue to be members of NATO, so long as we all derive the benefit of the protection from article five, by defending our own territory against whatever threats might exist in the future. That, in itself, makes a valid contribution to collective security within a NATO context and we shouldn't be diffident about that.

Hill: In fairly mundane terms how many personnel would you see in the force, and what would the main task be?

Thériault: As a proud Canadian I would advocate that we should, at least, assume much more of the burden for looking after that surveillance and that defence effort which pertains to Canadian territory – and not be seen as mendicants on American military aid programmes, which we are, in a sense. So at least having the capability, physically, to occupy or to deploy in Canadian territory, ensure the respect of Canadian laws, and be capable of a reasonable presence throughout Canadian geography, should be the principal aim of our future defence outlay. The land threat, per se, is very difficult to imagine.

Cox: I think we ought to cooperate with the US rather fulsomely in the surveillance and patrol of the air and sea space. But then having to address the question: where can you draw the line between surveillance – what I would call peace time capability – and stopping short of

what the United States has traditionally wanted to do, and may still want, which is actually to develop forces to fight the intercontinental nuclear battle. And I would say stop short because I have absolutely no confidence that it can be done. That is a terribly difficult balance to maintain.

Stein: I quite agree with the arguments that David has made and Denis has made, that with our brigade in Europe we have bought ourselves a seat at the table. I suspect that our self image here is discordant with those of both the United States and the Europeans. This



*The '87 White Paper
unfortunately
demonstrated very vividly
that the department
has a great deal of
difficulty coming to grips
with these issues.*

direct equation between military resources and political efficacy is a dramatically oversimplified one.

Often times we don't take the opportunities that are available to us because of the law of anticipated reaction. We are concerned about what the reaction in Washington will be. But I suspect that we exaggerate it. I would argue very strongly for a fresh and independent Canadian effort to think about the security dimension of the relationship, as well as the defence dimension of the relationship – and to build through strength. We do have a reputation as institution builders abroad and it's not based on our brigade in Europe. We do have a reputation based on peacekeeping – and the demand for that product is going to grow enormously. This is a plea not to think of our limitations but to think of our political resources on the security issue, which we systematically underestimate.

Morton: We come back to an old historic reality of Canadian defence since the 1860s and that is, either there are no threats or there is such an enormous threat, we can't do anything about it. Who is going to attack us? And the answer is at the moment, no one. In fact, no one really intended to attack us during the Second World War, if the truth be told, yet three divisions were deployed on two coasts to prevent it – more for political than military reasons, as the military complained. We also have to protect our territory for the sake of the US.

An historic answer, whether we buy our seat at a table some place or whether we do it for ourselves, has been to set a fee. It was a million dollars in 1865 and it is now eleven billion dollars and probably will be less after the next federal budget. And we say to the military: go and spend it, but first of all make sure you have protected constituencies. Because we have historically and always spent it with a political dimension, because there is no *military* rationale that is so supervening and obvious that you have to do it a certain way.

Out of that money we should devote ourselves to preparing capabilities for the unforeseen; it's the unpredictable that seems to me to justify a variety of capabilities and no particular strength to perform them. It's why I would keep the brigade in Europe, because it is the only place they can see first class conventional warfare practised by their neighbours. It is why I sustain a heretical and wicked preference for nuclear submarines because it seems to me they are the only warship worth having in the twenty-first century.

Peacekeeping is the great morale builder. It is the only thing the public think the military are any good for. It is a distraction from military roles, but it is unfortunately the one that everybody out there will put as priority one, and one has to respect that political reality. I always think that it satisfies a kind of benign imperialist urge among Canadians – how good the lesser breeds are being kept in order by our lads in blue berets. It is peacekeeping that expanded the British empire – lump by lump by lump. The natives are restless and have killed a missionary; peace must be restored. The Americans did the same thing on this continent. So I say peacekeeping doesn't have as high a rating in my mind as it might out there.

Stairs: If you don't have power, and we don't have much, then what you have to have is ideas. You occasionally can beat the big battalions with that. It may well be that the diplomatic folk, who are writing the cables every ▽