

tology, and in which he prides himself as though it were a great philosophical discovery. The Institutes, he says, "claim to have announced for the first time the true law of ignorance, and to have deduced from it its consequences." But when scrutinized, the theory of ignorance is found to amount to nothing more than an expression of the results of the Epistemology as a function of a new term arbitrarily, though not inappropriately, introduced. What the Agnoiology seeks to determine is, the object of ignorance; and it teaches that the object of ignorance, like that of knowledge, is a synthesis of subject and object. In Prop. I. ignorance is defined to be "a privation of something consistent with the nature of intelligence." Hence (Prop. II.) "all ignorance is possibly remediable; and (Prop. III.) we can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known; and hence also—if the Epistemology of the Institutes be supposed correct—the object of ignorance can be neither the Ego or subject *per se*, nor objects (popularly so called) *per se*, but only a synthesis of subject and object. Now it is plain that every thing here depends on the definition of ignorance as a "privation of something consistent with the nature of intelligence." The definition is a very good one; and the deductions made from it are perfectly logical; but where is the wonderful merit of defining a word and then expressing the results of the Epistemology in terms of that word? Or what occasion was there for the show and parade of demonstration with which this is done by our author? Indeed, for any purpose that it serves, the Theory of Ignorance might very well have been omitted altogether. The use to which it is put will be seen when I mention that the Ontology opens by announcing three alternatives of Being. "Absolute Existence or Being in itself is either *first*, that which we know; or it is *secondly*, that which we are ignorant of; or it is *thirdly*, that which we neither know nor are ignorant of." By showing (as he thinks he has done) that what we neither know nor are ignorant of is the contradictory, and also that Absolute Existence is not the contradictory, Professor Ferrier eliminates the third alternative, and concludes that Absolute Existence is either what we know or what we are ignorant of. But (by the Epistemology) that which we know is the synthesis of subject and object; and (by the Agnoiology) that which we are ignorant of is the synthesis of subject and object; therefore, whether Absolute Existence be the one or the other of the two alternatives to which it has been reduced, it must be the synthesis of subject and object. Now surely it was unnecessary to create an Agnoiology, merely to play the part here assigned to it. Why might the alter-