

and whether the members of the United Nations fall behind it and do their best to make it work. If they do not do this, these sanctions will not work either, if they are put into effect. We are committed to the policy of co-operating in regard to selective obligatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter when they are brought before the United Nations, because we feel they will—and we hope they will—have the effect in Rhodesia of bringing about a state of mind which would result in negotiations on the basis that the rights of the majority in that country are respected as to the form of government under which they wish to live. This is the only basis on which these negotiations would ever succeed.

We also made it clear that we do not think that objective will be accomplished by the use of military force, which might have results far beyond those which are visualized by pressing for that kind of military sanction. Therefore, we believe we should confine our efforts in this regard to economic sanctions and the financial and economic isolation of this *de facto* illegal government . . . .

I wish I had more time to discuss NATO but I have not. I know that the committee is anxious to get on with other business. But while we have been considering China, Southeast Asia and Rhodesia we should not overlook the fact that a key area of the world remains Eastern and Western Europe, and that NATO remains a vital agency for peace and progress in that area through its provision of machinery for collective defence and for building up the Atlantic Community.

Important changes are taking place in NATO. We who have believed in NATO from the beginning, as I know all members of this House have, should remember that what was exactly the right form of organization for 1949 is not necessarily the right form of organization for 1966. I think these changes will have to be reflected in the form and structure of NATO.

For one thing, . . . the European countries should be given or should take a greater share in the control and functioning of the collective defence organization. But, if they are to do this, they will also have to take a greater share in responsibility too. I think that, if we are to keep NATO going as an effective organization (and I hope we can) we will have to move toward a form of partnership between the North American side of NATO and the European side of NATO, both sides working together. We in NATO will also have to move away from the immediate military defensive side toward (and I hope this turns out to be the case) political discussion with Eastern Europe and the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

We in NATO have been talking about this for the last ten years but have shied away from it. Some of its members have thought that this would be a sign of weakness or would be too defensive, but it is pretty well agreed now that a very important function of NATO is to establish contact with the other collective security organization in Eastern Europe. If this is to be done, then all members of NATO will have to work together—and this includes France.

I am sure no one regrets more than the members of this House the abandon-