

Cruise Missile Testing

I would like to have the Hon. Member explain to the House how she thinks the Government should balance this matter. It does not matter which Government is in. How do we balance the rights of the privacy of individuals with the rights of the rest of us to ensure that those employees are examined by CSIS so that they cannot be part of any so-called international terrorist plot?

Ms. Mitchell: Mr. Speaker, I do not really feel that this is one of the areas of my expertise. I do not want to take the time of the House to filibuster when I really do not have enough information.

Mr. Cooper: Mr. Speaker, I have a short question to ask of the Hon. Member. It has been very obvious to everyone that I really wanted to have an opportunity to speak on this issue. The reality is that the Government has a wonderful record on this matter. We have a wonderful Minister who has done a marvellous job. The Parliamentary Secretary from Alberta has done a tremendous job in representing my province in this issue. There are people such as Lynda Chapin in the Minister's office who are just incredible. Even the Hon. Members on the transport committee deserve to be recognized.

I put a lot of work into the remarks that I wanted to make. It is unfortunate that I have run out of time. I want to say that the Government's record is one that we can all be proud of when it comes to VIA Rail.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear!

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Paproski): It being two o'clock, the House will now proceed to the consideration of Private Members' Business as listed on today's Order Paper.

• (1400)

PRIVATE MEMBERS' BUSINESS--MOTIONS

[English]

NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS

CRUISE MISSILE TESTING

Ms. Pauline Jewett (New Westminster—Coquitlam) moved:

That, in the opinion of this House, the Government should consider the advisability of giving notice, under the terms of the weapons testing umbrella agreement with the United States, for the termination of cruise missile testing in Canada.

She said: Mr. Speaker, the motion to which I am speaking today advocating the termination of cruise missile testing was originally introduced a couple of years ago in its present form, although we have been arguing for the termination of cruise missile testing for over five years. Even though this particular motion was introduced in 1986, it is even more relevant today than it was then.

One need only look at the headline in today's edition of *The Globe and Mail* entitled "U.S., Soviets raise stakes in vast northern arena" and at the subheading "Bear Bombers keep interceptor planes busy" to realize that the momentum of cruise missile development, and indeed bomber and interceptor development, has picked up enormously and tragically in the last two years.

The article is in one way somewhat misleading because it does not address one of the main reasons for the accelerated activity of both the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly with bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles, in the last two years. As everyone in the House knows, the air leg of the Soviet triad is the weakest, whereas it is close to the strongest, if not the strongest, in the American nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly attempts are being made by the Soviets to increase their bomber-cruise missile leg of what is usually referred to as the triad.

However, what has undoubtedly given them and indeed a great many Canadians cause for alarm in the past two years has been the development of ADI, the U.S. Air Defence Initiative. It is this Air Defence Initiative which was mandated by President Reagan in July, 1985, to which Canada has signed on, that is developing very advanced technologies both to knock down Soviet air-launched cruise missiles in Canada's northern air space and to advance the first strike cruise missile capabilities of the U.S. in the far North. The Air Defence Initiative is seen by many observers, if not most observers, as not simply a retaliatory instrument but, rather, as a first strike device.

A very good article written by a Canadian, David Kattenburg, appeared in the February 27, 1988 issue of *The Nation* on Canada's intimate involvement in the offensive air initiative being pursued by the Pentagon and to which, undoubtedly, the Soviets have been responding since 1985 by increasing their overflights in the North.

It is unfortunate that the article this morning did not go into the historical development of the increased momentum generated by the Pentagon's Air Defence Initiative and by the modernization of the cruise missile and of cruise missile technology involved in these developments.

A few years ago when we were first objecting to Canada testing nuclear weapons capable cruise missiles, some of those who were not concerned about the testing argued that at that stage the air-launched cruise missile could not possibly be used in a surprise attack, that it was too slow, too short-ranged, and too susceptible to radar. They argued that it would be purely an instrument to maintain stable deterrence, that it would not be and could not be used for first strike purposes.

That argument, in so far as it applied at all, simply no longer applies with the development of what is called the advanced cruise missile, the ACM, or what is generally often spoken of as cruise missile modernization.