

Germany, then we must conclude that since 1941 it has never foreseen any formula other than partition. The U.S.S.R. used the war to attempt a total solution to her Western border which had been vulnerable for ten centuries, and applied a similar formula in the Far East, although it was content to leave Manchuria to the Chinese communists. Since 1945, the U.S.S.R. has steadily tried to secure the removal of Western power from the vicinity of its borders; but it has failed to remove the West from Berlin and from Korea, and it has had to measure the failure of its propaganda campaign of thirteen years to secure the withdrawal of troops from foreign bases by the proportionate multiplication of Western bases around the Soviet periphery.

The successors to Stalin have retained his security objectives but they have been compelled to reduce the costs and dangers of his policy and to try to reduce international tension. While the real thrust of their policy has until recently fallen in Europe, they have lately sought a share in high council on the Middle East and they have sought to secure a respectable global presence for the Soviet state by extending their commercial links. Excessive and unco-ordinated industrialization in the bloc and the gradual sophistication of the thinking of the economists and administrators who must make the Soviet economy work have both tended to sharpen the need for the U.S.S.R. to expand its commercial links with the outside world. Moscow can not have it both ways. It cannot seek to multiply its long-term commercial links with the non-communist world and, at the same time, ensure stability at home and foment chaos and collapse abroad. Under the impact of reality, the official rationalization of trade with the non-communist world has become less and less Marxist, and the party is under pressure to reconcile its formal view of the prospects for Western capitalism with the assumptions underlying the actual policy of the Soviet state. In this respect it is confronted by a mounting dilemma.

The Soviet attitude towards international law must also have implications for the Western assessment of Soviet external ambitions. The U.S.S.R. has never repudiated the principles of international law; indeed during the past twenty years Soviet jurists have unceasingly concentrated on the implications of existing law for the immediate external problems of the Soviet state. The Soviet approach to international law is ultimately shaped by expediency and is increasingly conservative. Its most troublesome characteristic is a pathological obsession with sovereignty and the Soviet insistence on an absolute attitude to this question, which delays international agreement and prevents it from exercising a maximum influence in international organizations, indicates the degree to which the Soviet regime is nervously preoccupied with problems which are defensive and domestic in character. Acceptance of the principles of international law, adherence to the major conventions for the prevention of war, and a steady appeal to the law to indict an antagonist and to justify itself, all these mean that