

coalition tends to stress the second, the national and social basis of the regime. These different approaches to the problem result in different policies, which may jeopardize cooperation in Asia.

The first approach counsels militant counter-action; impatience with any course that seems to temporize or compromise; support for any anti-Communist leader or group, regardless of whether it has - or deserves - popular support.

Specifically, it implies that our policy should be to strengthen and assist the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa in every possible way as the one which in due course will overthrow the Peking regime. The assumption is that once the Chinese people, persecuted, oppressed and disillusioned by Communist tyranny, realize that unrest inside the country can be supported by strength from outside, they will rise and join the armies which come to their rescue.

It will, however, be difficult to work out any united policy toward China on this basis. It means, frankly, a declaration of active and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, not only against Communist aggression, but also against Chinese communism.

The other, the more qualified concept, can also split the alliance apart if it is interpreted to mean that all that has happened in China is an agrarian revolution, a surge of nationalism, joined with social and economic reform and allied to Moscow mainly because of the intransigent opposition of the United States. While the Chinese masses may well be far more interested in rice than in Marx, and may acquiesce in any government which promises them land and food and shelter, it is unrealistic to the point of dangerous self-deception to ignore the fact that these stirrings, these passions, have, for the time being at least, been harnessed to violence and revolution by the forces of international communism for purposes which are reactionary, aggressive and prejudicial to peace.

To understand the meaning of Asian communism, to place it, as we should, against the background of foreign exploitation and feudal oppression, is one thing. But it does not mean that at this time we should welcome into the international community, as a state willing to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter, a regime which has committed aggression in Korea and has yet to show that it is willing to contribute to a peaceful and democratic solution of the Korean or other Asian problems.

Unite against aggressors, not Asians!

What, then, should be done to keep the alliance strong and united as it faces the coming test provided by our different approaches to Far Eastern problems?

In the first place, the Western European nations and the members of the Commonwealth must appreciate that the American people have made great sacrifices in resisting aggression in Korea against Chinese Communist armies, and are determined that this Communist aggression, if repeated, must be defeated once and for all by whatever measures are