

or their representatives, and a Defence Committee, likewise made up of the Defence Ministers or their representatives. The Council would, of course, be primarily concerned with broad political questions, and the Defence Committee with the relation of military and political considerations. In addition to these bodies, a Chiefs of Staff Committee, with a permanent combined staff, will probably deal with central military planning. The question of unity of command could be handled by designating Commanders-in-Chief for various areas or by setting up skeleton staffs to study the problems relating to possible theatres of operation. Lastly, the matter of supply --shipping, raw materials, food, communications, and so on -- would come under some sort of Military Supply Committee. These main organs would, of course, be augmented by various working groups and subcommittees. The efficient integration and organization of the units established will be of the highest importance. Its achievement, however, will depend more on day to day friendly contacts, on the growth of the habit of consultation and cooperative work, rather than on high-sounding principles and grandiose formulae.

May I make one further observation in closing? If the Atlantic Pact is thought of as a heavy black line on a map, fencing off a certain area from aggression, and behind which a group of nations concern themselves solely with their own security, then the Pact may prove to possess the same fatal weaknesses for its members as the Maginot Line mentality possessed for certain countries before the war. In this day and age, even collective isolation is a weakness. There is now no area in the world which is beyond the concern of all freedom and peace-loving nations. It would do us little good if we moved only from national isolation to area isolation. Security, like war, knows no limits.

This is a very sketchy, and, I am afraid, inadequate examination of such an important subject as the making of the Atlantic Pact. As one who participated in that high adventure, my abiding impression is one of an earnest desire on the part of the representatives of the various governments concerned to accept compromises and make concessions in the interest of general agreement. Behind this was the full confidence we had in each other's good faith, good will and peaceful intentions. No single country involved in this Pact has had any aggressive purpose in bringing it to a successful conclusion, and no country could or would use it for any aggressive purpose now that it has been signed. The communists may rage that this is not so. We will refute their charges by the only proof that matters, our record in the days ahead. We will show, I am sure, by that record, that this is indeed a Pact of Peace.

S/C