

aggression against neighboring states; and participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms. A version of this Code is being promoted in the U.S. Congress, and other countries such as the United Kingdom are moving in a similar direction. In May 1997 fifteen Nobel Laureates began a campaign for a global code of conduct.

The need to push for such responsible behavior in the form of a Code is obvious, and the effort itself should continue, as it is yet another way to highlight behavior which violates these norms. But for the issue at hand, the prevention or reduction of civilian casualties due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the Code of Conduct approach has some distinct disadvantages. First, this approach has always been at the forefront of efforts by national governments and those opposed to the arms trade. As opposed to the building blocks reviewed in this presentation, at the global level very little support has been shown for such an approach. The call to do something about current problem needs something new to galvanize international public opinion. Second, principles involved in the Code approach are high politics and at the heart of what divides the globe on the issue of arms and conflict. Third, if the approach being discussed in this paper will have to rely on non-traditional verification of compliance, as in the case of the land mines treaty, these principles will be very difficult to operationalize and observe. Fourth, because of the conceptualization problem, states will have an easier time of excusing their behavior by stating that they are indeed complying with the Code. In sum, operationalizing the Code of Conduct in a series of practical measures that can be implemented by states and NGOs will be difficult.

In a sense the campaign to force states to responsibly acquire and export arms is already underway, and will and should intensify. However, given a state's sovereign right to engage in legal arms trade, the potential for establishing international norms will always be limited, as has been shown in any of the exercises designed to develop such norms (e.g., UN Register of Conventional Arms). Since a significant portion of the humanitarian damage stems from light weapons which are acquired illicitly, and the potential for a consensus for action has already been demonstrated, it is this mode of acquisition that should be the focus of an Ottawa Two process.

A. The Treaty

Goals and Objectives

As with land mines, the major objective of a treaty should be the human security of the all who live on this planet. As stated by Foreign Minister Axworthy in Oslo, we must "struggle to limit and restrain the horrendous impact of human conflict." Specifically the goal to preventing the use of these arms in a manner which causes the humanitarian, economic and social damage that is well known. Where such arms are already acquired and/or being used with this effect, the arms and their effects should be reduced.

Since the illicit modes of acquisition are well documented, a campaign should also have as an objective the prevention and reduction of acquisition using these illicit means.