

of the U.N. is to control conflict, by consent if possible, by enforcement action if necessary. The use of force or coercion is subject in principle to the agreement of the Permanent Members of the Council to its use. I say in principle because while it is clearly the sense of the Charter that coercive action cannot be taken by the U.N. without unanimous great power consent, it was also the expectation of the majority of governments at San Francisco that this consent would be forthcoming in cases of acts of aggression or flagrant breaches of the peace. When by 1950 this expectation had proved to be illusory, the Assembly asserted the right to make recommendations for the maintenance of peace and security, including the right to recommend the use of force to maintain or restore peace if there was a breach of the peace and the Council was prevented from taking appropriate action. Canada was a leading advocate of the Assembly's right to assert this residual power and has continued to be ever since, on the grounds that collective action to stop aggression is the overriding purpose of the organization and must not be frustrated by the abuse of the veto power.

We were confirmed in our opinion by the Assembly's role in the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956. It has been argued that the recommendation to establish the Force was ultra vires of the Assembly's authority because it is a military force with potential if not actual coercive functions. Whether or not the functions of the Force are defined as peacekeeping or enforcement action, and we have always thought it to be the former, seems to me however to be irrelevant to the point that the Assembly can make recommendations for action in the circumstances I have described and that such recommendations serve to implement the purposes of the U.N. if they obtain the required two-thirds majority.