

therefore reduce the disposition to launch a pre-emptive strike in situations of extreme crisis.

In regard to the respective proposals at Geneva, the counter-force question remains essentially unchanged. Under both proposals and before modernization, neither side has a high-confidence capability to eliminate the ICBM forces of the other in such a way that there could be no ICBM riposte. After modernization, the US will be extremely close to that capability, but the Soviets may then have vastly complicated the calculation through the deployment of mobile missiles.

In considering the Geneva proposals more broadly, however, it may be useful to ask two questions:

How deep are the reductions in the respective proposals?

Which areas offer the most promise for negotiation?

In response to the first question, the Soviet offer would reduce strategic 'nuclear charges' to 6,000. However, in their proposal are included all American intermediate-range forces that can reach the Soviet Union, while excluded are the SS-20s targeted against both Europe and Asia, the GLCM and Pershing II missiles, and intermediate-range Soviet aircraft and SLBMs. In reality, the Soviets would be left with nuclear charges in the order of 9000 for targeting against North America and Western Europe, while the US, Britain and France would have less than 7,000 nuclear charges of long- or intermediate-range for targeting against the Soviet Union.

In the American proposal, the US, Britain and France would be left with more than 11,000 nuclear charges of long or intermediate range for targeting against the Soviet Union, while the Soviets would have around 9,000 for targeting against North America and Western Europe.

In sum, both proposals offer deep cuts in certain categories of weapons,