

attempt at compromise, suggested that aircraft be supplied by countries not members of an alliance, but this was categorically rejected by the East. Notwithstanding, the final rendition of the Stockholm Document states that aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement between inspecting and receiving states and under certain circumstances an inspecting state will be permitted to use its own vehicles.

### THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF STOCKHOLM

Political will was required by all sides to reach an agreement because, in the end, each participating side had to give up some part of its proposals. The East gained only one of their declaratory measures, the non-use of force, although not as a treaty or even as a separate document. Notification of independent air and naval activities and numerical constraints on the size of exercises are not included. The numerical threshold for notification is lower than that originally envisaged by the East. National Technical Means (NTMs) and consultation as means of verification have been replaced by challenge on-site inspection with no right of refusal. A mandatory observation regime is in place.

The West failed to get its measure on the exchange of information on force locations, notification of mobilization, out-of-garrison activity and a lower threshold. While some textual ambiguity exists which could lead to potential interpretation problems, the overall result goes far beyond a mere cosmetic gesture and has the potential to increase openness in the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The political importance of Stockholm as part of a process seems to be confirmed by the issuance of the Budapest Appeal and the Brussels Declaration, described below.

### THE BUDAPEST APPEAL

The Budapest Appeal was issued in June 1986 by the Consultative Committee of WTO states. Much of what was contained in it and the accompanying Communiqué was 'déjà vu' and familiar to the West's arms control negotiators. The most notable element in the appeal is the proposal to undertake initial troop reductions by NATO and the WTO of 100,000 to 150,000 troops respectively and an unspecified quantity of tactical aviation, each within one or two years. If successful, this could be followed by further reductions as a result of which, by the early 1990s, both alliances' troop levels could be reduced by some 25% as compared with present levels.

Regrettably, like the initial Soviet proposals at Stockholm, both the Appeal and the Communiqué are replete with political statements concerning, for example, "the struggle for peace, socialism, and against

imperialism"<sup>21</sup> which detract from the seriousness of the proposal and tend to point, at least initially, to a propaganda motive for the exercise. Only time will tell whether or not the necessary political will exists to tackle comprehensive conventional arms reductions in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The East-West, bloc-to-bloc, MBFR negotiations have not been able during almost fourteen years of trying, to reduce NATO and WTO troop levels in a much more limited area.<sup>22</sup> The West, however, in the Halifax Communiqué and more recently through the Brussels Declaration, has signalled its readiness to consider the latest Budapest proposal in a comprehensive manner.

### THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION

The Brussels Declaration, issued by NATO foreign ministers in December 1986, in response to the WTO Budapest initiative signalled the West's readiness to discuss enhancing conventional stability in the whole of Europe. The Declaration underlined the military imbalance and asymmetries between the East and the West and identified six objectives which would need to be agreed in a mandate for negotiations: the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces designed to eliminate disparities; a step-by-step approach which guarantees undiminished security for all; elimination of the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action; additional CSBMs to further increase openness and calculability of military behaviour; application to the whole of Europe in a manner to reduce regional imbalance and prevent circumvention; and verification based on exchange of information and on-site inspection.<sup>23</sup>

The third CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna has been in session since November 1986. Initial discussions have reviewed the record of compliance with the Helsinki Final Act provisions and at mid-1987 had only just begun to discuss the new security initiatives. The answer as to what direction the East-West dialogue will take from here on is analogous to the answer given to Alice in Wonderland by the Cheshire Puss — "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."

### CONCLUSION

The Stockholm experience has shown that it is possible to achieve adequate results on some arms control issues provided objectives are limited, national vital interests are not placed at risk and a step-by-step approach is followed. Moreover, arms control negotiations cannot be separated from political relations, which, as Stockholm has shown, need not be good but must not prevent positive interactions.

In any negotiation where superpowers participate, their relationship will always be a major factor affecting