

the convention as well as facilities which produce, process or consume these toxic chemicals..."

In the current rolling text, CD/881, there seems to be a dichotomy between States rights to do anything with any toxic chemical as long as it involves actions "... not prohibited by the Convention", and Schedule [1], the only agreed repository for STLCs, which treats all listed toxic chemicals as compounds that are chemical weapons subject to the aggregate one metric tonne limit. In other words the general purpose criterion continues to be inconsistently applied in the discussions.

More recently the concept of a Schedule [...] or [4] has been the subject of negotiations and has elicited considerable debate. The title for this proposed schedule is, "Production of STLCs not listed in Schedule [1]". Such chemicals are to be monitored as in Schedule [2] except that various production thresholds will dictate monitoring procedures. As is currently being discussed in Working Group 4 it is now proposed to place all of these chemicals in Schedule [2], although as structured in CD 881 this schedule was set up for key precursors for those chemicals that appear on Schedule [1], and is unrelated to other kinds of chemicals or toxicity. There has also been no criteria developed to distinguish between those STLCs that could be used for chemical weapons and those that would have no chemical weapons value.

There have also been few attempts in the schedules to deal with other lethal chemicals and other hazardous chemicals that could be used as chemical weapons other than the placement of BZ into Schedule [1] and the possibility that some widely produced toxic chemicals in Schedule [3] may fall below the supertoxic lethal threshold.

Schedule [3] is currently directed at chemicals that are produced in large commercial quantities (CPLCQ) and could be used for chemical weapons purposes. There are in fact two classes currently listed: large scale production chemicals previously used as chemical weapons, and other chemicals that are mainly precursors to known chemical weapons.

Discussion:

The fact that more than one type of chemical appears on Schedules [1] and [3] and discussions seem intent on developing Schedule [2] in the same way suggests that toxicity categories are no longer the only criteria for the schedules. Perhaps a more reasonable approach would be to view the schedules as incorporating three verification or