were shewn for an order to change the venue from Toronto (where, no doubt, the assignees would have laid it) to Goderich, where Baker and his four fellow complainants reside. Weldon and Brussels (defendants) cannot object to this, as it gives them the advantage of being prima facie entitled to have these actions tried at Toronto. On such a motion the assignees would urge two objections: (1) that no preponderance of convenience was shewn such as is necessary under the cases. I do not refer to them, as they are to be found in Mr. MacGregor's valuable and exhaustive article in 38 C. L. J., pp. 433-460. (2) That a fair trial cannot be had in the county of Huron.

The question of convenience, as was said in one of the cases, is really one of expense. . . . I see that the return fare from Goderich to Toronto is $6.75. Now, in these 5 cases taken together, I gather . . . that there are in all between 15 and 20 witnesses whom the various plaintiffs will call at the trials of their respective actions. Putting these at 16 in all, their fares would amount to $108. Then each of the witnesses must be allowed on the average 3 days each at $1.25, which would be $60 more, making in all $168. The defendants' witnesses in these actions would be practically the same. . . . It is manifest on the question of expense that there is a sufficient preponderance to decide the question of the venue in favour of Goderich.

That, however, is not the only point for consideration. There is the more important objection urged by defendants, that a fair trial cannot be had in the county of Huron. This is based on two grounds: first, that a good deal of feeling has been aroused among the farmers and other residents of that county; and, second, that certain newspapers have published articles prejudicial to the claims of defendants. . . .

[Roche v. Patrick, 5 P. R. 210, Davis v. Murray, 9 P. R. 229, Walker v. Ridgeway, 11 Moore 486, Pybus v. Scudamore, Arnold 464, and Walker v. Brogden, 17 C. B. N. S. 571, referred to.]

But an examination of the evidence on which this ground is based does not convince me of its existence in the present case. The articles referred to . . . were published nearly three years ago, and are most unexpectedly mild—I might almost say perfectly unobjectionable.

However, whatever effect might perhaps be due to such considerations is entirely counteracted by the offer of the plaintiffs to dispense with a jury. . . . I will therefore follow the order that was made in Davis v. Murray, and direct