

"As for the non-commissioned officers throughout their career, they are far more dependent on the regimental staff than on the Captain, whose good opinion is not nearly so important to them as that of the Adjutant.

"A good deal of what I complain of has grown up of late years by necessity. Improvements in fire arms and the general advance of military science rather took us by surprise, and regimental officers had not, as a rule, the necessary amount of professional knowledge.

"Hence, specially trained staff officers were appointed to whose zeal and intelligence the service has been much indebted. But thanks to their efforts to the school of musketry, and to what I think I may call the great military revival which has taken place amongst us, I hope that the time will soon come (if it has not already arrived) when the services of these special officers may be dispensed with, and the whole responsibility of the professional education of subalterns, non-commissioned officers, and privates may fall upon the Captain, as it does in Prussia, not excepting that portion of it which now devolves upon the regimental Adjutant, whose position is unique, for I do not believe that a subaltern in any other army occupies so high a position and has so much influence as falls to the lot of our Adjutants. Now I have a great respect for the British Adjutant, he is almost always a good officer, and when he rises in rank the experience which he has gained in the regimental staff proves most valuable to him, and I doubt not that a large proportion of our ablest Generals have been regimental Adjutants. Still I would clip his wings for they overshadow greatly his brother officers, particularly those whom I think we should do much to elevate, namely, the Captains."

And that is the ground taken by those people in Canada who have given the subject due consideration, especially as with us the whole organization depends on the popularity and military, as well as patriotic instincts of the Captains.

It is evident that the adjuncts of an exploded and now impracticable system, such as that on which the regular army was organized, cannot be made to suit and is not applicable to an organization based like ours on totally different conditions—the principle of which are not the necessity for training a select class for foreign service—nor constituting our Military Institutions life professions for a surplus population; but the absolute and positive necessity we are under of training our whole able bodied population to the use of arms for defensive purposes. In such a case *outside influence* would not only be injurious, it would be simply destructive.

It is quite evident the closer the ties which bind the Captain to his command are drawn—the more intimately he is connected with every detail of discipline, instruction, tactical and otherwise, the more efficient such command will become—and if this rule holds good in the regular service where recruits are bought for the Captain to command, how much more is it necessary in our organization, where the Captain is obliged to provide and recruit his own contingent, without the daily shilling which makes the warrior tough according to Lord Byron?

As the only incitement which this country can hold out to its soldiers must be the fostering of their military instincts and patriotism, it would most assuredly be unwise to interpose between a Captain and his men, his neighbours and friends, such an institution as the "British Adjutant," with his necessary staff, no matter how efficient such might be in training mercenary troops.

The very report we are now reviewing furnishes an example of the evil consequences which we shall detail in another article next week.

"The two great problems to be solved in maintaining such an Army as the exigencies of modern warfare require, undoubtedly are: to obtain the number of men requisite for its annual contingent of recruits, and to provide a sufficiently rapid flow of promotion among its officers, without entailing upon the State inordinate expense in the way of pensions, retiring allowances, and half pay. Hitherto England has not found any great difficulty in achieving the latter object; but, before the abolition of purchase, this steady flow of promotion was obtained at the cost of allowing the officers of her Army to obtain such a vested interest in existing institutions, some of which were manifestly and notoriously prejudicial to the well being of the Service, that reforms which were urgently required, could not be undertaken. The purchase system, in fact, secured a certain flow of promotion, since it assured that few men who had not private means were likely to enter the Army, and obliged them on their entrance and at intervals during their career, to deposit large sums of money, which in after years they were glad to get back again by retiring from the Service by selling their commissions. But the very fact of their having purchased these commissions gave them that vested interest in them, which is especially conceded in England to all rights obtained by paying money, and which so greatly stood in the way of a reorganization and consolidation of our land forces. With the last of the purchase officers, however, will disappear what has hitherto been a powerful inducement to retire. Moreover, poorer men can now enter, and in truth are now yearly joining our Army, than was possible formerly; and they, being altogether dependent upon the Service, must perforce remain in it until they have earned such retirement as shall be sufficient for them to live on. Therefore there must come, unless measures are taken to prevent it, an ever-increasing stagnation of promotion, and how to prevent this will be one of the most difficult tasks which the Government will find itself called upon to face. That the scheme which, according to report, will be recommended by the Army Promotion Committee, will be adopted we do not for a moment believe. The result would most surely be to entail enormous charges upon the country, only to flood the land with a number of men in the prime of life without occupation, although accustomed to an active life, and obliged to subsist upon a miserable pittance. That, however, the difficulty must be met, is forcibly demonstrated by reports which reach us of a large amount of openly avowed discontent among the officers of the Prussian Army. During the long years of peace which succeeded the long wars in the early part of this century, promotion in that army became, as is well known, very slow. An officer was considered fortunate if he ob-

tained his company after twenty years' service, and every garrison was full of grey headed subalterns. But the Prussia of those days was a poor and humble country. Living was cheap, and its people were content with frugal fare and inexpensive pleasures. But the brilliant successes achieved by Prussia in the wars of 1866 and 1870 have changed all this. They raised Prussia from the ranks of the inferior States into a foremost place among the Great Powers of Europe. They have caused a great increase in the cost of the necessities of life, and have introduced a taste for luxurious living and ostentation before unknown. At the same time the losses suffered on the battle field gave to the Army a temporary rapid flow of promotion. But now, after five years of peace, promotion is again settling down to its normal condition, and consequently we are not surprised to hear that the officers of the Army who before were well content with their lot, are now becoming discontented with the returning slowness of their promotion. How deep and widespread such a feeling must be when it finds expression among a well-disciplined body of officers as the Prussians admittedly are, can be readily conceived, and certainly the existence of such a spirit must be detrimental to the efficiency of the Army. But how can it be checked? Clearly only by either engaging in another war, or by spending money in granting sufficient retiring allowances to induce officers to leave the Army contentedly. Which alternative Prussia will adopt remains to be seen; the question which concerns us is, which shall we elect when the difficulty is brought home to ourselves, as it must soon inevitably be?"

The foregoing article is taken from *Broad Arrow* of 5th February, and shows the result of Lord CARDWELL's reorganization of the British Army. In the first place experience has proved that the "reforms" instituted by that very incompetent and presumptuous politician resulted in making it difficult to get men to serve in the ranks at all; and in the second, it is now evident that the officers will be, as a class, inferior socially to their predecessors—more dependent on the army as a profession, and, as consequence, more costly to the country; so that the Whig Radicals in endeavoring to economize, have in reality increased the expenditure for military purposes with the result of rendering the army less effective.

It is no use attempting to point out to the advocates of those changes that the army is really an aristocracy, pure and simple, that consequently its leaders are more likely to be drawn from the higher and wealthier than from the middle and lower classes—that the interests of the State is not served by making it a mere school for adventurers, and that it must be restored to its normal condition in one of two ways if it is ever again to be effective—either the principle of purchase must be restored—or the army must be recruited by volunteering from the Militia and Reserve forces, each officer bringing the contingent due to his rank with him. It is all sheer nonsense shewing examples from what Prussia has done or is doing—such examples are good as guides, just as a light ship is valuable to point out the situation of a shoal, but it would not be wisdom or sea-