

## Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman.

(Continued from page 293.)

## THE STORY OF INSANITY.

Three unpleasant episodes in Sherman's otherwise most satisfactory military career, stand out prominently in this history. One is the set back he received at the opening of the war, by Cameron's fastening upon him for a time the reputation of insanity; the second is the intrigue of McClernand against him, and the third the disapproval of his convention with Johnston after the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and the accession of President Johnson. To each of these considerable space is given in the narrative and the circumstances are detailed at some length.

It was in October, 1861, that Mr. Cameron visited Sherman at Louisville, attended by Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, and six or seven gentlemen who turned out to be newspaper reporters, one of whom was Sam. Wilkeson, a well known veteran at the quill. All of these gentlemen were admitted to a military conference in Sherman's room at the Galt House, in which room the General some years later repeated to the writer the incidents of this visit as they were brought up fresh to his recollection by the association of the place, and substantially as they are recorded in his volume. He says:

About this time my attention was drawn to the publication in all the Eastern papers, which of course was copied at the West, of the report that I was "crazy, insane, and mad," that "I had demanded two hundred thousand men for the defence of Kentucky," and the authority given for this report was stated to be the Secretary of War himself, Mr. Cameron, who never, to my knowledge, took pains to affirm or deny it. My position was therefore simply unbearable, and it is probable I resented the cruel insult with language of intense feeling. Still I received no orders, no reinforcements, not a word of encouragement or relief, and . . . Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell arrived at Louisville about the middle of November, with orders to relieve me, and I was transferred for duty to the Department of the Missouri, and ordered to report in person to Major General H. W. Halleck, at St. Louis. . . . At the time I was so relieved I thought, of course, it was done in the fulfilment of Mr. Lincoln's promise to me (that he would not tax him with an independent command), and as a necessary result of my repeated demand for the fulfilment of that promise; but I saw and felt, and was of course deeply moved to observe, the manifest belief that there was more or less of truth in the rumor that the cares, perplexities, and anxiety of the situation had unbalanced my judgment and mind. Still, on a review of the only official documents before the War Department at the time, it was cruel for a Secretary of War to give a tacit credence to a rumor which probably started without his wish or intention, yet through his instrumentality. Of course, I could not deny the fact, and had to submit to all its painful consequences for months; and, moreover, I could not hide from myself that many of the officers and soldiers subsequently placed under my command looked at me askance and with suspicion. Indeed, it was not until the following April that the battle of Shiloh gave me personally the chance to redeem my good name.

The newspapers, he adds, "kept harping on my insanity and paralyzed my efforts. In spite of myself, they tortured from me some words and acts of imprudence." The result

was Sherman was ordered from Sedalia back to St. Louis, where he found Mrs. Sherman, who, "naturally and properly distressed at the continued newspaper reports of the insanity of her husband, had come on to see him. The chief sinner, it appears, was Halstead, of the Cincinnati *Commercial*, who "was generally believed to be an honorable man;" but when asked why he, who certainly knew better, would reiterate such a damaging slander, "answered, quite cavalierly, that it was one of the news items of the day, and he had to keep up with the time; but he would be most happy to publish any correction I might make, as though I could deny such a malicious piece of scandal affecting myself." "This recall from Sedalia simply swelled the cry. It was alleged that I was recalled by reason of something foolish I had done at Sedalia, though in fact I had done absolutely nothing, except to recommend what was done immediately thereafter on the advice of Colonel McPherson, on a subsequent inspection. Seeing and realizing that my efforts were useless, I concluded to ask for a twenty days' leave of absence, to accompany Mrs. Sherman to our home in Lancaster, and to allow the storm to blow over somewhat. It also happened to be mid-winter, when nothing was doing; so Mrs. Sherman and I returned to Lancaster, where I was born, and where I supposed I was better known and appreciated."

At the expiration of this leave Sherman was assigned to the camp of instruction at Benton Barracks. Though it was mid winter, Halleck was pushing his preparations most vigorously, and with him, General Sherman tells us, originated the movement up the Tennessee, carried out in February by Grant, who was then under Halleck's orders, and which resulted in the capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson—"the first real success on our side in the civil war." The battle of Shiloh followed, of which we are told that "Hildebrand's brigade was soon knocked to pieces, but Buckland's and McDowell's kept their organization throughout. Stuart's was driven back to the river, and did not join me in person till the second day of the battle." Out of this battle "a controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usual maintained an imperturbable silence." As a consequence Grant was substantially left out of the subsequent reorganization, "and was named 'second in command,' according to some French notion with no clear well defined command or authority." He rarely complained, but "I could see," says Sherman, "that he felt deeply the indignity, if not insult, heaped upon him." One day Sherman learned casually that Grant had applied for a thirty days' leave, and immediately called to see what it meant:

I found him seated on a camp stool, with papers on a rude camp table, he seemed to be employed in assorting letters, and tying them up with red tape into convenient bundles. After passing the usual compliments, I inquired if it were true that he was going away. He said, "Yes." I then inquired the reason, and he said, "Sherman, you know. You know that I am in the way here. I have stood it as long as I can, and can endure it no longer." I inquired where he was going to, and he said, "St. Louis." I then asked if he had any business there, and he said, "Not a bit." I then begged him to stay, illustrating his case by my own.

Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a mere newspaper assertion of "crazy;" but that single battle had given me new life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with him that, if he went away,

events would go right along, and he would be left out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident might restore him to favor and his true place. He certainly appreciated my friendly advice, and promised to wait awhile; at all events not to go without seeing me again, or communicating with me. Very soon after this, I was ordered to Chewalla, where, on the 6th of June, I received a note from him, saying that he had reconsidered his intention, and would remain.

## INTRIGUES AGAINST SHERMAN AND GRANT.

Sherman's own turn came again soon, and he found need of all the philosophy he had so kindly put at the disposal of his friend, when on the morning of January 2, 1863, during the movement against Vicksburg, Admiral Porter told him that General McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo, and it was rumored he had come down to supersede him. General Sherman went down at once to meet him, and put himself under his orders, explaining the position of affairs:

General McClernand was appointed to this command by President Lincoln in person, who had no knowledge of what was then going on down the river. Still, my relief, on the heels of a failure, (the failure of the attempt against Vicksburg from the Yazoo,) raised the usual cry, at the North, of "re-pulse, failure, and bungling." There was no bungling on my part, for I never worked harder or with more intensity of purpose in my life; and General Grant, long after, in his report of the operations of the siege of Vicksburg, gave us all full credit for the skill of the movement, and described the almost impregnable nature of the ground; and, although in all official reports I assumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that had General Morgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank Blair's brigade on that day, we should have broken the rebel line, and effected a lodgment on the hills behind Vicksburg. General Frank Blair was outspoken and indignant against Generals Morgan and DeCoursey at the time, and always abused me for assuming the whole blame. But, had we succeeded, we might have found ourselves in a worse trap, when General Pemberton was at full liberty to turn his whole force against us. . . . Porter's manner to McClernand was so curt that I invited him out into a forward cabin where he had his charts, and asked him what he meant by it. He said that "he did not like him;" that in Washington, before coming West, he had been introduced to him by President Lincoln, and he had taken a strong prejudice against him. I begged him, for the sake of harmony, to waive that, which he promised to do.

Further on in the siege of Vicksburg Gen. Sherman tells us:

We all knew, what was notorious, that General McClernand was still intriguing against General Grant, in hopes to regain the command of the whole expedition, and that others were raising a clamor against Gen. Grant in the newspapers at the North. Even Mr. Lincoln and Gen. Halleck seemed to be shaken; but at no instant of time did we (his personal friends) stacken in our loyalty to him. One night, after such a discussion, and believing that General McClernand had no real plan of action shaped in his mind, I wrote my letter of April 8, 1863, to Colonel Rawlins, which letter is embraced in full at page 616 of Badeau's book. . . . This is the letter which some critics have styled a "protest." We never had a council of war at any time during the Vicksburg campaign. We often met casually, regardless of rank or