

possible, then Science laid claim to the result and inherited the labour of Philosophy. In like manner, the Philosophic distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter has led up to the work of modern Science in explaining phenomena in terms of matter and motion, and so bringing them under the domain of mathematical calculation.

In another way the contrast drawn between Science and Philosophy seems unfair. We are pointed to the splendid practical results of Science in contrast to the alleged barrenness of Philosophy. But the immediate practical results necessarily belong to the study of phenomena. If all the questions of Philosophy could be finally answered, if the contention between realists and idealists could be set at rest for ever, the result could not be practical in the same sense in which the results of the study of chemistry and electricity are practical. Even in Science itself there are wide regions of theory which lead to no directly practical result. Yet we do not therefore despise them. Again, the question is raised of the comparative certainty of the conclusions of Philosophy and Science. Mr. Lewes is never weary of telling us that the conclusions of Science are capable of verification, and thereby reach a certainty which is unattainable by Philosophy. But in sober fact this so-called verification is nothing more than confirmatory evidence, which renders the conclusions to which it is applied more probable than they would be without it, but by no means confers absolute certainty upon them. The constant advance of Science, of which we boast, takes place not only by the ever-fresh addition of new scientific conceptions to those previously held, but also by the continued modification of the conceptions already existing. That which at one time has been accepted as a verified truth, after a few years is shown to have been only a rough approximation to the truth, and gives place to a newer conception, recognized in its turn as the latest truth of Science, but destined in all probability to be itself replaced before long by a still further advance. It follows that our present scientific conceptions, notwithstanding their verification, cannot be accepted as absolute truth ; but it is strange