

We all know that when we receive a perception (here remember that perception is always equivalent to knowledge, because it produces it) of cold or heat by touch, or of hunger or thirst by appetite, it produces a sensation of pain or pleasure, of attraction or repulsion, in the mind producing it. In like manner the perception of an object in threatening relations, or in those of dislike or horror, makes the corresponding states or sensations of fear, dislike, or horror, in the mind perceiving it. Take, for example, the perception of heat by touch. The heat as objectively perceived produces a peculiar sensation of pain or repulsion in the subjective state of the mind produced by the perception of the heat. The objective heat is not perceived disjunctively from the subjective pain which it produces in the perceiver; but the two come wrapt together in one perception; the heat, as objectively perceived, being swathed in the subjective sensation produced by it, and the mind at the same moment distinctly perceiving the outside heat as contradistinguished from its own subjective sensation or state.

Again, in looking at a beautiful sunset, its perception arouses in the mind, subjectively, the sense of beauty or admiration. The skies as perceived by us are just a mere bed of colour, a compound of its seven elements, easily analyzed by the physicist; but they are of that really inherent in them, but because they are just such in their character that they arouse the subjective sense of beauty or admiration in our minds at the moment of perception. At the moment of perception the whole sky lies steeped in the sentiments produced by it in the mind—both the sky and the sentiments being perceived together, and yet the outside picture and the inside sentiments being perfectly distinguishable from one another.

Take also the case of a beautiful landscape. Here the mind, looking beyond the mere sense presentation by which the landscape reveals itself, forms perceptively or inceptively its conception. The contour of the hills, the sweep of the valleys, the other natural adornments of wood and water, are of that peculiar character that, just at the moment in which the conception of the whole is forming, it swathes itself in the subjective sense of beauty, which it is its peculiarity to arouse in the mind. We call landscapes of that character or harmony of parts, beautiful, because the conceptions they create in the mind stimulate the sense of the beautiful.

It is in the preceding manner also that the perception or inception of a desirable object may awaken love, esteem, or the desire of possession. The object has such qualities that the perception of them arouses subjectively in the mind of the perceiver the desire of acquisition; and in order to perceive our own subjective state, we must at the same moment perceive the outward object that excites it. We thus can never perceive the subjective sense alone. The exciting object is thus like the light, that warms while it illuminates the hand.

So also in the perception of an act of injustice or of goodness; a sense, condemnatory in the one case and approbative in the other, springs up subjectively in the mind in the instant of the perceptive act. We cannot help ourselves; it is in the nature of our constitution that these subjective senses or feelings do arise in the objective perception or inception of things.

These illustrations need not be multiplied at present, as it may be necessary to illustrate more minutely as we go along. There is certainly considerable difference in the character of the various subjective senses or feelings, but these will be more minutely distinguished afterwards.

There are only two ways in which the subjective senses or feelings can be aroused or excited: either (1) by the creation (by perception or inception) of a conception which excites them; or (2) by the remembrance of an exciting conception already in the mind.

The first way may perhaps be reckoned the chief one, as it is by perception or inception that all conceptions are originated and brought before the mind for the first time, and as the conception at its first formation, being entirely new, possesses a greater exciting power over the subjective senses.

The remembrance of an exciting conception will, however, at any time arouse a subjective sense or feeling afresh, and sometimes one entirely new—as, for instance, the recollection of some early days often arouses a desire to revisit the scenes of youth.

There are only two ways in which we can become conscious of a subjective sense or feeling: (1) *At its birth*, we can be conscious of it only by remembrance; it comes up in remembrance as connected with that which caused it—as, for example, the recollection of a pain once experienced but not now felt.

(2) *If a subjective sense or feeling is in present exercise*, we can be conscious of it only by perception; the mind immediately perceives its own subjective state in connection with the exciting conception.