

was sometimes the case, the other way around.

The Canadian foreign policy review, if anything, goes further. It defines foreign policy as the extension abroad of national policies. The test of a sound foreign policy, it argues, is the degree of relevance it has to national interests and basic national objectives. The most appropriate policy for the 1970s, therefore, our review concluded, will be one which strengthens and extends sound domestic policies dealing with key national issues.

To the extent that the national interest is seen as an active foreign policy ingredient, reactive policies are rejected on both sides. On the Canadian side, it is argued that an empirical approach cannot be continued indefinitely. A reactive, as distinct from an active, concern with world events no longer corresponds with international realities or with the Canadian Government's approach to foreign policy. What is required is a sense of direction and purpose so that Canada's foreign policy is oriented positively in the direction of national aims. The United States proceeds from not very different assumptions. For too long, in the view of the U.S. Administration, American policy has consisted of reacting to events. The United States tended to be drawn into situations without a clear perception of where it would end up. It will be necessary, in future, to infuse American actions with a sense of direction, to make a conscious effort, in fact, to create the conditions the United States wants.

### Two different entities

In sum, the broad premises and underlying perceptions of the two foreign policy reviews have many points in common. It is in their implications for two quite different entities on the world scene that they inevitably differ. Perspectives of the Canada-U.S. relationship, in particular, could not differ more sharply.

On the Canadian side, we could hardly ignore the impact of the United States on virtually all aspects of our foreign relations. But the foreign policy review did not attempt to articulate a comprehensive policy to govern our relations with the United States. What it did do was to point to some of the central ambiguities of the Canada-U.S. relationship. It raised, without elaborating on it, the concept of counterweights to the influence of the United States. It also underlined the need for careful management of a relationship that was likely to become increasingly

complex, if not conflict-prone. Its major prescription envisages "the judicious use of Canadian sovereignty" in shaping the Canadian environment.

The U.S. foreign policy review and its annual updatings do not, on the other hand, deal specifically with Canada. To the extent that U.S. policy-makers think of Canada in broad foreign policy terms at all, it is in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. That Doctrine, as President Nixon explained it on his recent visit to Canada, rests on the premise that "mature partners must have autonomous independent policies; each nation must decide the requirements of its own security; each nation must determine the path of its own progress". To the extent that Canadian concerns are apprehended in Washington, therefore, the feeling is that a world in which power is more widely diffused and in which the relative weight of the United States is diminished should afford a country like Canada greater breathing space.

At first glance such a prognosis appears reassuring. In practice, however, it may give less than adequate weight to two important considerations. The first is that the Canada-U.S. relationship cannot be encompassed by governmental policies alone. To the extent that they see a threat to Canada in that relationship, most Canadians would be prepared to concede that it is a threat undesired by the United States. The trouble is that, even as an inadvertent process, it has acquired a momentum that, as one American student of Canadian affairs has recently put it, is "subject to profound internal growth". In the second place, the Canada-U.S. relationship is bound to be affected, at the levels of both deliberation and inadvertence, by policies on the U.S. side that reflect an explicitly narrower interpretation than in the past of the U.S. national interest.

This explicitly narrower interpretation by the United States of its national interest appeared to be reflected in the far-reaching economic measures that President Nixon invoked on August 15, 1971, as representing the elements of a "new economic policy". These measures were intended to compel changes in world monetary and trading arrangements. As such, they were global in their impact. They were not specifically directed against Canada. Because of the high concentration of our trade with the United States, however, and the affiliated structure of our industry, Canada was probably more exposed than any other country to the immediate im-