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(c) that the aerial resources survey presently being carried out in Pakistan be extended to include a soil survey of an additional 35,000 square miles at an estimated cost of \$50,000.

## Canadian government relief for Haiti

55. The Secretary of State for External Affairs referring to discussion at the meeting of November 18th, 1954, said that it had been ascertained that while codfish would be a most welcome form of assistance, flour would not be usable in Haiti. It appeared that additional codfish could be readily provided in place of the flour suggested. Haitian authorities had also expressed interest in receiving potatoes, and this possibility was being investigated by the Canadian Red Cross. Accordingly, he recommended that the \$25,000 made available for hurricane relief in Haiti be either entirely in codfish, or partly in the form of potatoes instead of flour as originally proposed.

An explanatory memorandum was circulated.

(Minister's, memorandum Nov. 30,1954-Cab. Doc. 260-54).

56. The Cabinet noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and agreed that the \$25,000 made available for hurricane relief in Haiti be used entirely to send codfish, or partly for potatoes if the Canadian Red Cross so recommended.

## Proposed Polish-Canadian trade talks

57. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said it had been indicated to our Charge d'Affaires in Poland that the Polish government desired to purchase in Canada 150,000 to 200,000 tons of wheat, for payment partly in cash and partly on credit. In addition, the Polish government was anxious to discuss broader trade relations between Canada and Poland and, in particular, the matter of customs valuation of Polish imports. They seemed to be prepared to accept settlement on this latter point along the lines of the recent Czech ,arrangements. Folish authorities had made their approach attractive in that they had mentioned purchasing a considerable quantity of Canadian exports, even in excess of what they would be prepared to sell. They would not insist on being sold strategic goods, and the difficult problem of Polish assets in Canada had not been discussed.