

I had the best intelligence that the enemy's post was not affailable in the rear; and the truth of that intelligence was corroborated by several of our own officers, who went over the ground in the spring following. The intention of my march was to attack Washington, had I found it advisable when I came to the spot, and not to remain in the field in that inclement season.—Merely to move him from that post was no object.

What does Major-General Grey say in his evidence upon this subject?

Q. "Do you think an attack on the enemy's army at White-Marsh would have been advisable?"

A. "I think an attack of the enemy, so very strongly situated as they were at White-Marsh, would have been highly imprudent."

*Pages 86, 87, 88, and 89, contain a description of Washington's situation at Valley-Forge in the winter of 1777, and spring of 1778—and an accusation against me for not having attacked him in that situation.*

The author's plan of besieging the enemy at Valley-Forge is in the highest degree absurd. Had I made a division of the troops in the manner he proposes, I should have exposed them to be beaten in detail. I have in my Narrative given a reason why I ought not to have risked an attack with so small a prospect of success. Major-General Grey's evidence, however, may perhaps be deemed more decisive.

Q. "Do you think it would have been advisable to have attacked the enemy at Valley-Forge in the winter, when the army lay at Philadelphia?"

A. "As affairs were then situated in America, I think an attack on the enemy at Valley-Forge, so strongly posted as they were, both by nature and art, would have been very unjustifiable."