

The UN action in Korea was an apparent fulfillment of these hopes. Canada regarded it as the first effective attempt by the UN to organize an international force to stop aggression. We had contributed for the first time to a UN peace-keeping operation when military observers were sent to Kashmir in January 1949. We had also supported the Secretary-General's proposal for a UN field service. But it was not until 1950 and the opportunities provided by the decision to resist aggression in Korea that we began to organize the procedures and to think in the terms which we have followed since.

The Canadian Army Special Force, raised for service in Korea, would, we hoped, have a continuing function in carrying out Canada's obligations under the UN Charter. We urged other member states to earmark national contingents so as to be better prepared to resist aggression if and when called upon to do so by the UN. We welcomed the establishment by the Assembly of a Collective Measures Committee, to look into the details of joint military planning. We appointed a representative to a UN Panel of Military Experts. Yet, once the Korean emergency had passed, the UN was to hear little more of these bodies. For the members of the NATO alliance, in particular, the strains and pressures arising from the military build-up in Europe soon pushed into the background the schemes for strengthening the UN. Moreover, after 1955 the character of the UN began to change. New member states added their distinctive interests to the torrent of talk and paper. The Western members no longer enjoyed the influence they had been able to bring to bear five years before.

In 1956, however, the development of crisis conditions in the Middle East enabled the UN once again to take measures which revived Canada's interest in defining its contribution to collective security. It was the UN Emergency Force which was to be the fruitful precedent for the growth of the concept of peace keeping. For the first time, organized military forces were deployed and commanded without participation by the permanent members and outside the framework of the cold war. Canada made a special contribution to the ideas behind the new Force, as well as providing its first Commander. On the one hand, it was a matter of urgent importance to us that some way should be found to bridge the gap which had opened up between our traditional European allies and the U.S.A. On the other hand, we saw in the situation an opportunity to implement the ideas we had put forward six years before at the time of Korea.

This is not the place to describe the characteristics of peace-keeping forces as they were defined by Mr. Hammarskjold in the light of the UNEF experience. What I wish to emphasize is that the lesson we drew from our participation in the Force was a further refinement of the earmarking idea. In addition to the desirability of governments themselves earmarking contingents for peace keeping, we concluded that the UN Secretariat must be enabled to plan ahead in advance of the next emergency. It was just ten years ago that the present Prime Minister of Canada proposed, in an article which appeared in Foreign Affairs, that governments be invited to signify a willingness to contribute contingents to the UN for non-combatant purposes and that some central UN machinery be created to make advance arrangements and to direct future operations. Since 1957, Canada has itself made arrangements for units of its armed forces to be on standby duty for possible service with the UN.