

the treatment necessary in order to enable them to fulfil their mission. It was pretty effectively demonstrated, in spite of what has been said by hon. gentlemen in some parts of the House about a lot of money having been spent on our forces with nothing to show for it, that within a very short time we were able to move everything required to put a battalion in the field, and indeed, we could put several battalions in the field if it were necessary to do so.

Whether that turned out to be the ultimate requirement of the commander of the United Nations force, we felt that something of that kind would be just as effective and as good an exercise as some of these simulated exercises that are constantly taking place to keep men in readiness to take the field if the occasion should require, because in this case there was something real for which the need for activity was being undertaken.

During that time there were negotiations going on, and there was some suggestion with regard to the placing of infantrymen. This again is something we have by way of hearsay concerning Mr. Hammarskjold's discussion with the Egyptian authorities when he went over there to secure their consent to the operation of this police force in their territory. It was suggested that the only place infantrymen could go at that time would be to Port Said; that there they would be coming to a place where there were large numbers of United Kingdom troops wearing the same uniform worn by our men; that our men might be taken for reinforcements being brought in for the British troops there instead of a part of the police force of the United Nations, and that this might give rise to incidents which would, at the outset of this operation, be an unfortunate occurrence.

That was something that had to be considered by the Secretary-General and by the commander of the United Nations force, and when he arrived in New York we were immediately informed that he felt he did not have in Egypt a proper base to administer at once any considerably increased number of infantrymen, and that what would be most useful to him at first would be a group of 250 to 300 engineers and signallers whom he could use in organizing and establishing his base. He also said that another thing that was very urgently required was air transport. He had only three civilian planes chartered from Swiss owners, and they had thought they could make two round trips per day but had found they could only make one. He said that was holding up the organization of the effective force that should be and that will be on Egyptian territory. We did have the air transports.

Again I say that, even had the commanding officer not been a Canadian we might have said as others might have said, "Here is our contribution. Make the best possible use you can of it." But it so happens that the man who is going to have the responsibility of command, is of course a United