

Evaluation

Community

Has the CFE proven itself to be flexible, able to compromise, and enforce rules-based behaviour, and as such, show us *community*? First, flexibility and compromise are dependent on the ability of the treaty members to agree on shared goals of an arms control regime. Müller argues that above all, a “core of shared objectives among the parties” is necessary for an arms control treaty to be successful.⁵⁹ It can be argued then that if at the treaty-systemic level, shared objectives exist, flexibility and compromise can be undertaken at the treaty sub-systemic level. As long as treaty member states remain faithful to the overall long-term treaty goals, accommodation within the framework of rules-based behaviour can take place. In order for flexibility and compromise to work, though, adherence to the long-term rules as stated in the treaty must be assured. Compliance must be monitored, noncompliance revealed, and long-term cheating dealt with. If *community* can be embedded in a regime alongside rules of enforcement, short term noncompliance can be dealt with in a cooperative, rather than confrontational, manner, and as such reinforce cooperation.

Does the CFE do this? One of the striking characteristics of the CFE has been its flexibility, especially with regards to the Russian Federation. This flexibility has been strengthened by a relationship of compromise between the key actors in the treaty area, especially between Washington and Moscow. Flexibility can be seen in the reaction by CFE Treaty community to Russian non-compliance in the flank zones. Non-compliance had been tolerated, officially, because outside of the flank, Russia has complied fully with the objectives of the CFE – Moscow shares the overall goals of the CFE with the other members.⁶⁰ But it was fully expected that when “internal” matters were dealt with, compliance would be quickly forthcoming. September 2002 provided an important payoff for the decade of flexibility towards Moscow, when Russia stated that it had reached its TLE limits in the Chechen region of its flank zone.⁶¹ Temporary deployments (TDs) are another area that the CFE has shown flexibility towards its treaty area members, making concessions not only to Moscow’s situation on its southern perimeters, but all states in general – embedding the idea of “military flexibility.”⁶² This ongoing flexibility within the framework of rules-based behaviour was most recently exemplified in the 2001 review process, where Russia has been given an extended time frame to remove military resources from Moldova and Georgia.⁶³

Granted, ratification of the CFE Adapted Treaty will not occur until these problems are fixed, stalling progress in other regional security issues. This will pose a significant test of CFE flexibility, as Russia attempted to stall the accession of the Baltic States to NATO in the case of a non-ratified CFE, caused by Russian violations of the flank zone limitations, a rather ‘circular’ problem. Moscow is concerned that NATO enlargement into the Baltics will be completed before these states accede to the CFE, raising the specter of unlimited troop levels for NATO on these territories.⁶⁴ But if the CFE Adapted Treaty is not ratified, this tool does not exist. Developments in Russian force structures over the past year have shown significant progress in meeting these requirements, though.

Flexibility towards other states is also evident. The inability of some states, especially East European members, to destroy or convert weapons within set deadlines due to costs, lack of technical means, or other constraints was dealt with by extending deadlines and offering financial and technical

⁵⁹ Müller, 2000, p. 79.

⁶⁰ Adam Boger, “Russia and the CFE Treaty: The Limits of Coercion,” *The Defense Monitor*, Center for Defence Information, Vol. 29, Issue 10, December 2000, p. 3.

⁶¹ Interview with Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade official, February 26, 2003.

⁶² Klaus Bolving, “The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe – CFE – Considerations concerning Baltic CFE-Membership,” *Baltic Defence Review*, No. 4, vol. 2000.

⁶³ “An extra year for Russian Withdrawal from Moldova,” *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2003, www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/moldova_janfeb03.asp; “Russia has mixes success with CFE implementation,” *Arms Control Today*, September 2001. www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_09/cfesept01.asp.

⁶⁴ Zdzislaw Lachowski, *The Adapted CFE Treaty and the Admission of the Baltic States to NATO*, Stockholm: SIPRI, December 2002; “Russia Raises CFE, Nuclear Concerns over NATO expansion,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, October-November 2002, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd67/67nr17.htm>.