

[TAYLOR] So that there had to be a sharing of that political responsibility too, and it was shared by a number of other Allied countries.

[HILL] Another element of this is that the Soviets ran quite a diplomatic campaign to try and influence Western public opinion, I suppose particularly Western Europe opinion. They wanted to persuade Western publics to reject these missiles, that is to say the Pershing II and the cruise. How well do you think NATO responded to that?

[TAYLOR] I think the response had to come as it did from the individual Allied governments. I think that about all you could do in NATO itself, within the consultative machinery of the Alliance, was to recognize collectively that dealing with public opinion was going to be extremely important, and to compare notes, and to make sure that what was said in one country was not contradicted by what was being said in another. Beyond that, I think the lesson of all analysis of the problem of coping with public information, and public opinion, is that the central machinery of the Alliance has a useful but quite modest role to play. In the end on these great questions in democracies where you are responding to your own electorate, it is the local government that has to bear the burden of carrying a case to the public.

[HILL] Well, my impression is that the best thing to do is to tell it as it is. I do not think that highly orchestrated public information campaigns are really the way to go. How would you feel about that?

[TAYLOR] Well, certainly I think it takes a clear political lead. I think it takes heads of government and ministers who understand the problem, are convinced that they have the right answer and are prepared to go out and say this is the problem, and your government believes this is the answer, and this is our stand, and we are prepared to take our electoral chances on it. I think political leadership is really the key in all that. Successful, modern public relations techniques no doubt have something to do with it, but they cannot redeem bad policy.

[HILL] Given that this was such an important feature in the period when you were at NATO, this whole INF question, is there any other element that comes to your mind in terms of the operations of NATO or Canadian policy with regard to NATO?

[TAYLOR] You mean INF or other issues?

[HILL] INF in particular. Any lessons that you might draw from your experience in that period?

[TAYLOR] Yes, I think that, as we know now, we may be on the verge of the first actual nuclear arms reduction agreement that has ever been negotiated, and if that negotiation is successful, it will limit these very missiles, perhaps eliminate them totally. We would hope that. But if you stand back a little bit, I suppose that you would have to allow that historic accident has driven us to this. We did not decide to deploy the SS-20s, and I do not think people are entirely certain yet why the Soviets decided to make the weapon and then to deploy it. But the result of it is that, ten and fifteen years on, the superpowers are perhaps fairly close to an agreement which will eliminate this category of missile, and that will be, if it comes about, the first nuclear arms agreement of its kind that has ever been successfully negotiated. Well, we know equally that these things are all linked, that what you do about Euro-strategic INF missiles is linked, in some way or another, to what you do or would hope to do about intercontinental systems, what you do about shorter range systems, what you do about battlefield systems, what you do about conventional weapons, what you do about chemical weapons; there are links; and the trick is not to allow the whole process to be