

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The CW convention is in the immediate future the only possible multilateral agreement in a major area of disarmament. My delegation welcomes the prompt re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with a mandate based on a reasonable compromise, and is convinced that under the leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden we shall be able to make considerable headway so as to come close to the conclusion of the convention.

Without at this stage going into the substance, I shall limit myself to two more general observations. The first concerns the need to conclude the convention at the earliest date in accordance with the recommendations of the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly. This would not only ensure the elimination of this abhorrent type of weapon, which is one of the major disarmament tasks, but would also have a great psychological effect as a proof of the ability of the international community to achieve measures of real disarmament. It would also add to the credibility of the Conference itself which has been seriously undermined in the past decade. From the political and organizational point of view alike, the moment is especially propitious for the mobilization of efforts aimed at the conclusion of the convention. There is a prevailing view that no big political, technical or procedural obstacles stand in the way of the negotiations; there is a mass of concrete proposals and ideas on outstanding questions; there is the new impetus provided by the recent Soviet-American joint statement. Finally, we have the collective wisdom and the dedication of the members of this body. As Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil observed, "we have assembled virtually all the necessary building-blocks" to complete our task.

My second observation concerns the need to ensure the universal character of the future convention and its rapid implementation after it is signed. We are of the opinion that some regional co-operative measures and activities before the conclusion of the convention may prove quite useful in this respect, as in view of the very nature of chemical weapons the most sensitive security concerns are likely to involve neighbouring States or States belonging to a given geographical region. These preliminary actions I am referring to might include declarations on possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, individual or joint political declarations of the States of a region indicating a resolve to become original parties to the convention, mutual trial inspections on a bilateral or broader regional basis, etc.