

So much for the principle of internationality and independence of the Secretariat and of the three ways in which it can best be maintained. Having accepted this principle in the earliest days of this organization, we are now faced with the problem of how to apply it in a period of high international tension. What should be the policy of the United Nations towards a member of the Secretariat who engages in subversive activity towards a member state? The Secretary-General says that such an employee should be dismissed. My delegation thoroughly agrees with this. So, we believe, do most delegations. The answer, however, raises a host of subordinate questions -- questions of definition, questions of evidence, questions of procedure, questions of law, and so on. The more important, or the more urgent, of these the Secretary-General seeks to answer in his report. As I have said before, I do not intend today to go into all these questions. I do intend to mention very concisely two or three specific points which my Government is particularly pleased to see in the report. In respect to one or two others, in which the final decision as to policy appears to be waiting at the crossroads, I shall indicate which, in the present view of my delegation, would seem to be the wiser road to follow at this time.

First, we are especially glad to notice that the Secretary-General reaffirms the right of freedom of thought possessed by the employee, distinguishing this from freedom of action or even of speech which, we agree, must be qualified. Next, we are pleased with his fresh assurances that he does not propose to dismiss employees upon mere rumour, hearsay or unsupported charge. We agree that there should be "reasonable grounds" for believing the employee to be subversive of a member government, and we prefer this basis to the alternative basis offered elsewhere of "reasonable doubt as to loyalty of the person".

With several, indeed with most, of the grounds for disciplinary action mentioned in the report we find ourselves in agreement, tentatively at least. In regard to one we have serious misgivings. Our present view is that it is not just or reasonable that an employee should be dismissed on the sole ground of having refused to answer questions, the answers to which might serve to incriminate him. We agree with several opinions which have been expressed that such refusal should cause the Secretary-General to view the employee with suspicion and should lead the Secretary-General to institute inquiries. It would, for example, seem reasonable that such a staff member should be asked to appear before the Secretary-General. It seems to us the sort of case in which the Secretary-General would normally have the assistance of the advisory panel. If the employee could not or would not, in this closed and confidential inquiry, explain his silence to the satisfaction of the panel or of the Secretary-General, the latter would then reasonably feel obliged to dismiss him.

There is one more particular point I should like to mention since I believe it to be of major importance. This is the question of appeal from the decisions of the Secretary-General. I think that most delegations here will agree with me that in the generality of cases a right of appeal must be an inherent part of any satisfactory procedure dealing with personnel matters. The existence of this right seems particularly necessary when so much, both of public and private concern, hangs on the effect of a