

new fortifications in the territory which remained to her, it would doubtless last months and years. But this is the only object of all the Czech objections. Above all it is completely incorrect to maintain that Czechoslovakia in this manner would be crippled in her natural existence or in her political and economic independence. It is clear from my memorandum that the German occupation would only extend to the given line and that the final delimitation of the frontier would take place in accordance with the procedure which I have already described. The Prague Government has no right to doubt that the German military measures would stop within these limits. If nevertheless it desires such a doubt to be taken into account the British and if necessary also the French Government can guarantee the quick fulfilment of my proposals. I can moreover only refer to my speech yesterday in which I clearly declared that I regret the idea of any attack on Czechoslovak territory and that under the condition which I laid down I am even ready to give a formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia. There can therefore be not the slightest question whatsoever of a check to the independence of Czechoslovakia. It is equally erroneous to talk of an economic rift. It is on the contrary a well known fact that Czechoslovakia, after the cession of the Sudeten German territory, would constitute a healthier and more unified economic organism than before. If the Government in Prague finally evinces anxiety also in regard to the state of the Czech population in the territories to be occupied I can only regard this with surprise. It can be sure that on the German side nothing whatever will occur which will preserve for these Czechs a similar fate to that which has befallen the Sudeten Germans consequent on the Czech measures. In these circumstances I must assume that the Government in Prague is only using a proposal for the occupation by German troops in order, by distorting the meaning and object of my proposal, to mobilize those forces in other countries, in particular in England and France, from which they hope to receive unreserved support for their aim and thus to achieve the possibility of a general warlike conflagration. I must leave it to your judgment whether in view of these facts you consider that you should continue your effort, for which I should like to take this opportunity of once more sincerely thanking you, to spoil such manoeuvres and bring the Government in Prague to reason at the very last hour.