

cious acts committed on the Government side in the suppression of the revolt are slurred over in summary sentences, generally with a reminder that the victims merely received the due rewards of their deeds. Considering the opinions that Mr. Froude has put on record respecting the mode in which Ireland was governed by England, one would have expected here from an English historian, if only for the grace of the thing—I do not, of course, speak of generosity—some little allowance for Irish errors and vices—some touch of compunction for the terrible calamities brought by his countrymen, however inevitably, upon the Irish race. But Mr. Froude has no such weaknesses. He is a marvellous adept in that sort of vicarious stoicism that loves

“ When others bleed to kiss the rod,  
Resigning to the will of God ;”

and not merely does he endorse all the rigours put in force—rigours which revolted and disgusted some of the best of those who were charged with their execution—but actually goes out of his way to suggest that they should have been heavier and bloodier. Referring to the escape of a portion of the rebel army from Vinegar Hill, he remarks that, if the mistake which made that escape possible was intentional, “it was misplaced leniency. Nothing but some decisive and overwhelming evidence of the consequences of a rebellion *carried out in the spirit which had been shown in Wexford*, would ever convince the Irish of the hopelessness of measuring strength with England, or prevent a repetition of the same folly, when opportunity seemed again to offer itself.” (Vol. III. pp. 442-3.) There is, perhaps, some doubt as to the exact force of the words which I have italicised ; but, taking the passage with its context, there can be no doubt at all that it amounts to a suggestion that it would have been well if the entire army at Vinegar Hill had been put to the sword. It is in this spirit, Mr. Froude thinks, that the Irish Rebellion should have been suppressed.

A few words before I conclude, on a question which has even yet something more than an historic interest—the measures resorted to by the Government previous to the outbreak for the seizure of arms and other purposes of suppression. Amongst these was the practice of

torturing by flogging, half-hanging, and what was called pitch-capping—putting caps of boiling pitch upon the head ; all which were employed against the peasantry in the hopes of making them disclose the places where the arms were concealed. The officer most directly responsible for these proceedings was General Lake, but they appear to have been approved by the Irish Government, and Mr. Froude thus comments on them :—

“ The seizures were not effected without severity. . . . Entire villages combined in determined resistance. Individuals, of whose guilty complicity secret information left no shadow of doubt, were compelled to reveal the hiding-places by the whip and the picket. Houses were burnt and entire families were exposed to serious suffering. Particular officers, it is likely, exceeded their orders. The officers of the yeomanry were taken from the local gentry, whom the murder system had not disposed to feel tenderly towards the accomplices of assassins. In some very few instances the innocent may have been confounded with the criminal. When society is disorganized, and peace can only be preserved by the strong hand, such misfortunes occur inevitably, and the responsibility for them rests with those who have rendered the use of force indispensable.” (Vol. III., p. 238.)

This defence has been supplemented by a reviewer of Mr. Froude's in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, who puts the case thus :—“ Suppose the Indian mutiny could have been prevented by flogging a certain number of Sepoy conspirators till they gave the information necessary to enable the Government to prevent the outbreak ; ought English authorities to have hesitated to flog at the expense of causing all that followed ? And if so, on what ground ?” This is no doubt a very convenient, though perhaps a somewhat cool, way of begging the question. Is it not equally open to me to put the case in this fashion?—Suppose the flogging of a certain number of Sepoy conspirators would have had no appreciable effect on the issue of the Indian mutiny, but would have very greatly exasperated the passions of the people, and increased the horrors of the struggle, ought English authorities to have flogged ? and if so, on what grounds ? Hypothesis for hypothesis, one way of putting the argument seems as good as the other ; but the question is, which coincides most nearly with the facts of the Irish case. Now I maintain that mine does ; nor need I go