ainly to it. The exciting the same. in which the subjective

nergy) acts.

es a part of the resolving t, and it (the subjective here, that all subjective moment, or a resolution nat in the first case the nary and only subjective diate resolving relations on included within the atly the same that the

posing it, the exciting e objective feeling or objective gratificatory lution or consent which ergy to carry into effect edium of the objective

the exciting relation of est class of subjective edium of the objective plass acting on the Ego etive act which gratifies a or consent, which has to carry into effect the brough the medium of

e objective conception otive; so also in regunation of the subjective y conception or motive

l five factors or causes onception, arouses the e motive gratificatory, ctivity; the subjective acts on the enbjective

which all these factors stificatory conception; or motive proper, and

which human volition illy these principles in

es, with none opposing under the stimulating tate of irresolution or coptions for the act tive before the mind he subjective feelings ptions excitant in the that the Ego feeling subjective feelings or thay would give, has

brevity and simplicity conception, etc., in all catory and pacificatory general term to imply

aroused within him the subjective feeling of resolution or consent to put forth then, or thereafter, the requisite subjective energy or act to secure it, that is, their gratification.

If the resolution is to do the act at once, the subjective energy goes forth at once to do it. If the resolution includes merely a resolution to do it at some other time, then the subjective energy will go forth to do it when the second resolutian is made. See foot note on Pacifica-

tion, page 34. In a case in which one class of motives for an act are opposed by snother class against the act:—The subject or Ego, under the stimulating influence of a powerful motive or motives, the act:—The subject or Ego, under the stimulating influence of a powerful motive or motives, but starting in a subjective state of irresolution or non-consent, makes a survey of all the onterest of the conception of each objective motives or conceptions for or against the act, bringing each (that is, the conception of each) objective gratificatory motive before the mind in the object, character, or relations which gratify respectively each of the subjective feelings or motives in the Ego (bringing in also the objective motives or conceptions excitant, in the same way, if any of the subjective feelings or motives are dormant); so that the Ego, feeling or perceiving through their medium the strong desire or aversion of the subjective feelings or motives within himself, may estimate therefrom the amount of gratification which each class would yield. In self, they estimate therefrom the another of gratification, pacification, etc., accruing to the subject or Ego on both sides, in favour of the act or against it, the subjective feeling of resolution or consent rises in the Ego to the strongest, namely, to put forth the subjective energy or act requisite to secure the gratification of the strongest; and the energy goes forth then, or thereafter, on precisely the same terms as specified in the preceding case.

By once going through this process, or by a repetition of it, the subject or Ego is in most cases able to arouse in himself a distinct subjective feeling of resolution or consent for or cases able to arouse in himself a distinct subjective feeling of resolution or consent for or against any particular act. It sometimes happens, however, that there is a kind of dead-look in the balance, from opposing motives either individually or in the aggregate appearing to be equally strong, and the subject's being unable to obtain a subjective feeling of resolution or consent over which ones he would yield. In this case a preponderating influence in favour of some of the sides may very usually be secured in weakening the force of some of the subjective feelings or motives on one of the sides, by familiarizing the mind with the loss of their gratificatory objects or conceptions, or in strengthening their force by looking at their exciting or ratificatory objects or conceptions more frequently, until the subject is able to obtain on catory objects or conceptions, or in strengthening their force by looking at their exciting or gratificatory objects or conceptions more frequently, until the subject is able to obtain or arouse in himself the subjective feeling of resolution or consent, over one and all on some one of the sides, in favour of those of the other. The enswathing subjective feeling of consent will always rise in the Ego to the strongest. There are only two conceivable ways of modifying the impulses to an act: either (1) by stimulating a greater or less degree of impulse in the subjective feelings or motives proper, by giving the ontward excitant or gratificatory conceptions a greater or less degree of simulating character; or (2) by making a change in man's moral nature or constitution.

In most of these cases illustrative of the processes, etc., of volition, as referred to in foot note, page 34, we have used the general term gratifying or gratificatory motive to imply alike both pseificatory or gratificatory motives, as they act alike in the will, and as there is no need to add to the complicity of these statements by the addition of more words than make the sense sufficiently clear.

It must appear evident, from what has been often said in the preceding pages, that as gratificatory or pacificatory objective conceptions are those which are chiefly used in a process of volition; exciting objective conceptions will be used only when the subjective feelings or motives proper are dormant, or when the exciting and gratificatory or pacificatory objective conceptions are one and the same.

Let us now add two or three examples illustrative, in a general way, of the process of

volition which we have been describing.

A man travelling from home and feeling hungry, eseing an apple lying on the highway may pick it up and eat it. Here the objective gratificatory motive is the apple lost on the road, which he may eat; and the subjective motive proper is hunger, and there being no

road, which he may eas; and she subjective motive proper is himself, and safe being no motive of an opposite character present to restrain the man, the subjective feeling of resolution or consent is at once aroused within him, to put forth energy, pick it up, and eat it.

But suppose the apple to hang in a farmer's orchard by the highway, the subjective feeling of hunger, acted on by the thought of eating the gratificatory object on the tree, urges him to pick it from the tree and eat it; but an opposing subjective feeling of conscience, aroused by the thought of such conduct, comes with a sense of the "ought-not-ness," or of the ill-desert, of such an act, and restrains the subjective resolution on the other side. Hunger pleads, the conscience feeling commands or threatens, and the subjective resolution fluctuates between them, till at last it rises in the Ego in favour of conscience.

Again, a man in Great Britain may receive a letter from a friend in America advising