

2. This led Aroutunian to state that the main reason why the Soviets had undertaken the resumption of nuclear testing was to counter President Kennedy's measures of military mobilization and strengthening of NATO defences after his interview with Khrushchev in Vienna last year. As Aroutunian put it, nuclear explosions were much more effective as a deterrent than the moving of USA tanks into Berlin.

3. I recalled to the Ambassador that the Canadian Government was against the continuation of any testing and hoped that the Soviet Union would continue efforts at Geneva to achieve agreement on the basis of the compromise proposals put forward by the eight uncommitted Powers. The Soviet Ambassador said that it was his impression that while the Soviet Government had accepted the Eight Powers proposal as a basis of further discussion, the Western powers had not. I told Aroutunian that Zorin had entered such reservations and interpretations as to make it questionable whether the Soviet Government had accepted the Eight Powers formula as a basis of negotiation or not, but we still hoped that further discussions in the Committee of Three might serve to clarify the respective positions and to bring about agreement. I recalled that the Soviet Government had previously associated themselves with the Committee of Experts report at Geneva and then reversed their position; their views on verification were, to say the least, confusing if not incomprehensible.

4. I went on to say that it was our hope that the Conference could register some agreement, not only in the analysis of the two plans on General and Complete Disarmament, but also on one or other of the collateral measures. I also explained to Aroutunian why we were particularly anxious that there should be no break whatever in the discussions at Geneva. The Ambassador seemed to agree with my argument that if the Geneva talks were suspended, it might be more difficult to resume discussions.

5. In this conversation, as in previous conversations, I got the impression that Aroutunian obtains very little information and direction from his own government and relies pretty heavily on newspapers. In concluding the interview he observed that he personally appreciated the efforts that the Minister was making in trying to promote agreement in Geneva.

G. IGNATIEFF

36.

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*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Ambassador in United States
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1773

Washington, June 13, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Repeat for Information: DisarmDel Geneva (OpImmediate); Permis New York, NATO Paris, Paris, London, Bonn, Rome (Priority), CCOS (JS/DSS) Ottawa (Priority) from Ottawa.

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DISARMAMENT

Yesterday afternoon (June 12) I paid my first call on William Foster, Director of Disarmament Agency, Adrian Fisher, his Deputy, was also present and I was accompanied by Rae and Nutt. I found Foster to be, on the whole, not repeat not pessimistic as to the future prospect for the disarmament negotiations. He believed that progress was being made, if so