

not the same occasion to apply for it, because they did not apprehend that it was ceded by *France* at that treaty. This in effect is what the author of the *Summary* means, p. 27. when he affirms, “ Nothing was more contrary to the intention of *France*, than to suppose she should have ceded to *England* ALL THE SOUTH PART OF THE GULPH OF ST. LAURENCE, as well as the south side [or country on the side] of the river of that name, as far as *Quebek*: for such a cession must have produced much more surely than the yielding up of *Cape-Breton*, all the effects which *Louis XIV.* had so justly apprehended.”

’Tis in vain to pretend want of intention †, and the improbability of ceding the country in question, from a suggestion of inconveniencies against facts: since the cession has been clearly prov’d by several kinds of arguments. This plea likewise seems to be contradicted by a clause in the answer of *Louis XIV.* of the 10th of *June*, 1712, cited in the same place * by the author of the *Summary*.

For the King, as a reason why he ought to have the sole possession of *Cape-Breton*, expressly observes, “ that should the English, being already masters of *Acadia* and *Newfoundland*, possess in common with the *French* the island of *Cape-Breton*; his ships, in case of a war, would be entirely deprived of the benefit of entering the river *St. Laurence*, and *Canada* would be lost to *France*. For the same reasons, he would reserve to himself the liberty of erecting forts in the isles (of the gulph †), and within the mouth of

† The absurdity of this suggestion is humously exposed in *The conduct of the French, with regard to Nova Scotia*, p. 60.

* P. 16.

† By the isles of the gulph, are to be understood the isles