

that troops ought not to be employed in the ordinary duties of police, I cannot help thinking that in almost every country, respect for the civil force is secured by a knowledge, that behind everything else there is a military array to be appealed to in the last resort. The functions of a police are to keep down crime, but it requires soldiers to suppress sedition. Another use, it appears to me, of a regular military force is to assert, by their very presence, the national rights of sovereignty. It is not the handful of soldiers on some particular spot that is material, but the fact that, just as much as the flag that flutters over their heads, they are the emblems of the national force, and that it is well known that any aggression on them will be resented with the whole resources of the empire. A serjeant's guard is in this light a representative of the entire English army. In exposed parts of our dominions this may be an important consideration.

The views above submitted upon the West Indies apply, with slight modifications, to the settlements on the Western Coast of Africa. Those settlements are maintained for the sake of one of the most cherished objects of English policy. They are too puny to be able to defray even their civil expenditure without assistance from British funds. It appears certain, then, that they could not afford to pay for troops for themselves, whilst without troops it can hardly be supposed that they could subsist in the midst of lawless Europeans pursuing an almost piratical trade, and numerous warlike African tribes. Be this as it may, however, the real question for the Government must be, I apprehend, whether the troops can be reduced, or altogether discarded, but not whether these small settlements can pay any material proportion of their cost.

The foregoing are reasons for which, I think, that an equal rate of contribution from all Colonies is not just, expedient, or practicable, and that any efficient attempt to enforce it would be attended with the risk of serious misfortunes. I prefer the other plan by which Her Majesty's Government determines the amount of force which it deems it reasonable to allot to the different Colonies, at British charge, as being required by the duties of the Sovereign State, whilst the Colonies themselves must pay for any additional number of troops which they may ask for and obtain. One advantage of this plan is, that instead of requiring us to enter into a long and probably irritating negotiation with all the Colonies, it executes itself, and is settled from time to time by the direct authority of the Queen's Government. It adapts itself to the varying circumstances of the several Colonies. And as regards the two most important collections of them, it is already in operation with the concurrence of their inhabitants. With these remarks, I propose, in the remainder of this paper, to review briefly the principal groups of Colonies, and to show how far this rule already applies.

NORTH AMERICAN PROVINCES.

THESE great countries contain three millions of people, and are for thousands of miles continuous with the United States. It is evident that no forces sent from home can be supposed to undertake the defence of this vast line of territory. The security of the inhabitants rests chiefly on their own patriotism and valour, of which they have already, whenever required, afforded brilliant and successful examples. The principle was propounded by Earl Grey in 1851, and was repeated by the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary for War, and Sir George Grey, as Colonial Secretary in 1854, that in Canada the fortified city of Quebec, and the fort of Kingston, with perhaps one or two outlying posts between Montreal and the frontier, should be garrisoned by the general troops of the empire, but that no more ought to devolve on the general Government. This proposition was acquiesced in by the authorities of Canada without a murmur, and they have set about active measures, at a considerable charge to themselves, for rendering their militia efficient. The harbour of Halifax is as much a station important to the general power of the nation as any of the places which have been enumerated in the list of military posts. It is only just that its garrison should be provided for out of Imperial funds; nor could the province of Nova Scotia, which is far from wealthy, be expected to tax itself for such a purpose, merely because this valuable Imperial post happens to be situated within its limits. Small parties of troops are at present stationed at the seats of government in Canada, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland. How far there may be sufficient motives to maintain these in connexion with Her Majesty's representatives, and as marks of the common tie which unites the empire, as well as what amount of inconvenience such