

nature of judgment. According to the traditional view, all judgment must be discursive and must contain a subject and a predicate. The traditionalists are right in maintaining that we cannot separate the subject from the predicate, for it is self-contradictory to assert that we may have predication of nothing. But they are untrue to scientific procedure when they maintain that all judgments must conform to the discursive type. A form of judgment in which neither subject nor predicate appears would obviate entirely the difficulty raised in regard to predication. It has been felt from earliest days both that impersonals are real judgments, and that they do not conform to the ordinary type. The search for a subject has shown the fruitlessness of the attempt, for either no subject is found or we must warp the natural meaning of the proposition.

When we lay aside all presuppositions and examine the impersonal form of expression on its own basis, we reach the following result: In its essential form the impersonal is the immediate recognition and assertion of an experience, in which the whole is recognized in its totality and not through its parts. But this totality gradually differentiates, until recognition of the whole can take place only through the parts. Here the discursive judgment appears. Now, inasmuch as we cannot assert at just what moment the immediate form of the impersonal passes into the discursive judgment, a mediate form appears, in which the symbolic subject indicates a content, however vague it may be. Here, again, growth changes the experience, until a definite, particular subject appears, and we have the full-fledged discursive judgment.

This point of view enables us to harmonize the various divergent types of theory. We can account for all the facts which they present without doing damage to any. We are enabled to see how those who asserted that the experience was individual and concrete had ground for their assertion, while at the same time admitting that those who maintained that the experience pointed to something general and universal had equal right to their opinion. Also, we are enabled to remove contradictions from both views by finding either that both subject and predicate are lacking, or else that both appear in a vague, schematic way.

As Kant says, percepts without concepts are blind, and concepts without percepts are empty. Each is meaningless when taken alone. Percepts present us with the discriminative side of the discursive process, while concepts give us the side of unity. We cannot have the one without the other.